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The U.S. Mediator Role in the Israeli Palestinian Conflict 
Ailyn Gonzalez 
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to examine the distinct U.S. administration policies in reference to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the creation of the latter. It details how 
successive administrations have helped, or not helped the countries move towards a 
solution of the crisis. In particular, the thesis looks at what the U.S. has done to 
promote peace in order to assist specialists make necessary reforms for success in 
their negotiations and peace talks. However, since it is really difficult to cover and 
examine each characteristic of a successful mediator, as well as relating it to the 
role of each administration, this research will focus on the commitment of the U.S 
administration as primary mediator of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The research is organized as follows: Chapter One introduces the main 
research questions and argues the importance of this investigation. Chapter Two 
reviews the literature in reference to the effectiveness of international mediation and 
the United States of America’s role as mediator of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Chapter Three aims to establish the United States of America’s participation during 
the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while Chapter Four examines the 
U.S.’s mediator role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Chapter Five discusses the 
current status of the U.S. as mediator of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Chapter Six 
 ix 
 
reviews some reasons for the U.S. withdrawal from active mediation.  Finally, 
Chapter Seven reviews some obstacles and opportunities for the American role of 
mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
The conclusion answers the main research questions laid out above, by 
asserting that the United State administration should take a more active and 
dominant role, and avoid withdrawal under frustrating circumstances. History 
suggests leadership, commitment, and a culturally sensitive approach should be 
maintained to further mediation and peace talks, instead of pushing for a solution 
that is not ripe. This would be more useful as compared to using Western mediation 
approaches, which are often not compatible with the Middle East region and their 
cultural situations. All of these factors have been deemed as necessary requirements 
for any international mediator to succeed. 
 
Keywords: Mediation, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, US foreign policy, Mediator role. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
The narration of war patterns behavior in the Middle East suggests that 
prevention and management of conflict strategies remains an obstacle for peace in 
the region. The unresolved conflict between Israel and Palestine has been 
approached by many; however the recurrence of failure and outbreaks of violence 
needs more attention when considering legitimacy and rights as important elements 
constructing solid bases for an Israeli-Palestinian long-lasting peace. 
As of today Israelis and Palestinians have not been able to agree on what 
constitutes a legitimate status quo, (meaning, what they can do, want to do and what 
they are going to do) and on the rights of both people.  The Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is deeper than this, since it is not an interstate conflict but also a conflict 
between and within two civil societies. This is the reason why this research aims to 
answer the following questions. 
 
1.1 Major Research Questions 
This thesis will examine the role of the United States as a primary mediator 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and at what point the United States of America 
has intervened as a mediator in the conflict. In addition, the thesis will seek to 
assess how and when has the U.S. role as mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
helped improve or worsen the situation? As will be demonstrated in the thesis, the 
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level of commitment of the US president to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict affects the success of the US as an international mediator in this 
particularly intractable conflict. 
1.2 Methods and Sources 
This thesis will analyze the literature regarding what makes a successful 
third party mediator in international crisis. Also, the thesis will describe the U.S. 
mediator role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, paying particular attention to how 
the U.S. role as mediator has helped improve or worsen the situation. In this 
context, the paper will explore negative and positive impacts of their role as well as 
its overall commitment to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, within a 
constructivist framework, supported by evidence from scholarly books, research 
papers, dissertations, and journal articles on the issue.   
For Anne-Marie Slaughter, Constructivism ¨is a set of assumptions about the 
world and human motivations¨, creating alternatives for other theories of 
international relations. Citing Wendt (2000) she sustains that ¨in this particular 
framework, the variable of interests in contrast, such as international institutions or 
domestic preferences, are not relevant for its objective facts about the world, but 
rather due to it social meanings¨ (Slaughter, Anne M 2011, p.19). And again, in 
(1995), adding that ¨this meaning is constructed from a complex and specific mix of 
history, ideas, norms as well as beliefs…which scholars must understand if they are 
to explain states’ behavior ¨ (Slaughter, 2011, p.4) 
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Constructivism deals with a set of propositions on how the International 
System works. The paradigm on conflict, its causes and its possible ways of 
transforming are rarely mentioned as roots of problems and / or its answers to a 
solution. Culture, knowledge, ideas, norms as well as values are human 
motivations, sources of an ideational agenda which define, states' foreign policies, 
and how material resources, their importance and actor dispositions are perceived. 
Therefore, constructivism is a relevant approach to use if mediation efforts on the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict are to succeed. 
 
1.3 Importance 
There are several reasons that make the U.S’s commitment to peace 
promotion a priority in the foreign policy. Why should the U.S. promote peace 
among Israelis and Palestinians?  First, this conflict triggers frustration and 
resentment that fuels the enemies of America today, supporting the justification of 
war with the U.S by extremist groups. 
 Second, this conflict weakens the U.S.’s moderate Islamic alliances, an 
important resource for bandwagoning against the enemies of American allies and 
friends, the moderates in the Islamic world, who are trying to fight American 
enemies (Riedel, 2011).  Although the promotion of peace to eradicate extremism is 
a solution, history suggests that some do not want a lasting peace, but to eliminate 
Israelis (Fendius, 2012).  For the US, it seems that its primary goal is to isolate 
extremism in the Islamic world and to strengthen the moderates, who are fighting 
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for peace and for the two state solution.  It almost goes without saying that the U.S. 
also retains a strong commitment to Israel and its continuation as a sovereign state. 
Finally, the U.S., as a powerful actor in the international system, is well-
placed to act as mediator; though whether it is committed to acting as such remains 
in question. But, the American academic circle, particularly speaking about the ones 
specialist in the Middle East has been of relative benefit. There has been a lack of 
promotion on public political debate about the Arab Israeli polemics, partly because 
those who are allowed a forum took almost identical pro-Israel positions. Therefore, 
some enhancement towards broadening the Middle East policy making process 
should be procured (Hudson, 1996). 
The importance of the United States as a mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is beyond any doubt in most of the Washington policy circles for years. The US 
leadership has played a significant role in negotiations in the past and the US is trying to 
continue to be the most important actor in bringing both of these arch-rival parties to the 
negotiation table. A fruitful peace settlement between the Palestinians and the Israelis is 
an essential strategic interest of the United States. If such an agreement is really possible 
then it would contribute not only to the regional stabilization of that part of the world but 
also resolve the resentment of the US policies across the Middle East. This resentment is 
in fact encouraging the terrorist recruiters and it is also hindering and restricting the US 
regional policies.  But it’s true that in spite of all the efforts of the sole superpower of the 
world, Israeli occupation is further entrenched each year, the people of both Israel and 
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Palestine are continuing to suffer, and the obstacles to peace are growing more and more 
difficult. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict encompasses many factors that need 
attention in order to come up with better conflict management and conflict 
resolution approaches. This literature review aims to embrace some concepts and 
use them as a starting point for this thesis. Some of these concepts are the definition 
of international mediation as a form of conflict management, and those 
characteristics which are important elements of a successful international 
mediation.  
It is also considered relevant for purposes of this thesis to establish a 
position in reference to the topic of international alliances and their compatibility 
with their mediators’ role during an international dispute, since research suggests 
that it is not alliances that are the most important element for purposes of successful 
mediation, as some authors allege, but the commitment of the mediator. Also, there 
are some positions that refer to international mediation within a domestic mediation 
framework, which establishes that a mediator must be neutral. This is contrary to 
some theories of international relations discussed herein. In order to make this 
point, it is important to explore: the origin of the practice of mediation in Western as 
well as non-Western cultures, discussing the role of culture as a neglected factor in 
international mediation; the conceptualization of the practice of international 
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mediation; and some characteristics identified as relevant for a successful 
mediation. 
Finally, it is also important for the purposes of this thesis to  establish the 
different theoretical approaches regarding mediation, such as realism, 
institutionalism, constructivism, and the trust oriented approach, in order to be able 
to take a specific approach that support this work.  
Gulliver (1979) sustains that “the practice of settling disputes through third 
parties intervention has had a rich history in both, Western and Non-Western 
cultures”, as well (Bercovitch, 2011, p.35). But while the use of this particular 
conflict management tool began to be implemented in the 20
th
 century, its 
qualitative study dates back only to the 1960’s (Schro & Gerner, 2001). “Mediation 
is not a random process. Mediators make choices that maximize the likelihood of 
achieving outcomes given their situation. Developing a better understanding of the 
processes that link mediator attributes to conflict management outcomes allows us 
to understand the madness behind the method of mediation” (Bercovitch, 2006, p. 
323).  Mediation in foreign affairs also has a long history and, similar to the 
progress of the nation-state system, has been employed increasingly. Diplomatic 
practitioners have come to contemplate mediation as part of their commodity, while 
some of the first experiences in this practice have been influential references to their 
personal experience and knowledge. International mediation in the political sphere 
is increasingly accompanied by the intermediary activities of several actors at the 
mid- and grassroots levels in societies experimenting intense violent clashes. A 
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mediator that intervenes in an international dispute may be categorized in different 
ways: A prominent personality (e.g., former U.S. President Jimmy Carter), a 
coalition of states (e.g., The Quartertet), small states (e.g., Norway) or an 
international organization (e.g., the U.N.) and more recently, international 
mediation is frequently done by a formal, regional organization, the United Nations, 
or representative of a state. At the same time, informal mediation by respected 
persons and religious figures acting as mediators, have come to be of increasing 
relevance in international mediation. A clear illustration for this scenario is the 
intervention of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and the low-profile, private 
negotiations of the Quaker community.  
In addition to dealing with the distinct measures, essential to achieving a 
mission or organizational objectives, these practitioners frequently find that they 
must involve different parties as part of this conflict resolution dynamic in order to 
meet their goals, such as maintaining a ceasefire, providing humanitarian assistance 
to displaced persons, or dispensing health care to vulnerable populations. “Recent 
manifestations of ethno-political conflict and the international community’s reaction 
to these have thus raised additional challenges for the theory and practice of 
mediation as a form of third-party intervention” (Fisher, 2001, p.6). 
Some of the components important to be present in order for international 
mediation as a form of international conflict management to occur are: “(1) A 
prolonged conflict, (2) reconciliation efforts made by individuals or actors involved 
have reach an impasse, (3) neither actor is able to face further costs or escalation of 
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the dispute, and (4) all parties involved agree to some forms of mediation and are 
ready to engage in direct or indirect negotiation” (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996, p. 
13). 
Mediation is “deemed to be partially successful when it has initiated 
negotiation and a dialogue between the parties. It is defined as being of limited 
success when it has achieved a cease fire or a break in hostilities only,” (Bercovitch 
and Houston, 1996, p.7).  Bercovitch (1991) contrasts this with a second finding, 
category failure, which is defined as “occurring when mediation has had not 
obvious or documented influence on the dispute, or the parties’ behavior” 
(Bercovitch and Houston, 1996, p.6).  
Some authors such as Bercovitch and Houston (2000) and Irani (1999) 
define mediation as “a specific type of political activity, which highlights the role of 
a third party, in facilitating a negotiation process. This third party may be a 
government official whose country is not a direct party in the dispute, someone 
associated with an international body like the United Nations, or unofficial 
diplomacy, representatives of a non-governmental organization such as the Quakers, 
or an individual such as Jimmy Carter, who may or may not be a citizen of one of 
the conflict states” (Gerner and Schrodt. 2001, p.1). 
Gelpi (1999, p. 108) also defines mediation as, “any attempts by third parties 
to produce a negotiated settlement, such efforts could involve anything from 
offering ‘good offices’ through official attempts at mediation or arbitration to direct 
forcible intervention”. 
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Marieke Kleiboer (1998, p.6) maintains that in international mediation in 
contrast to the traditional concept of domestic mediation a mediator only assist 
disputants in making their own decisions, although considerable pressure on parties 
is exerted occasionally in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. Different to 
arbitration or adjudication, mediation is not binding unless the involved parties 
choose to make them so. 
 In contrast, “according to Fisher and Keashly, mediation at the international 
level involves pacific interventions by credible and competent intermediaries who 
assist the parties in working towards a negotiated settlement on substantive issues 
through persuasion, the control of information, the suggestion of alternatives and in 
some cases the application of leverage” (Joao Gomez Porto, 2012, P.4). 
 
2.1    Characteristics of Successful International Mediation 
Kleiboer (1996) argues that mediation research pays particular attention on 
three main characteristics of a dispute that affects the results of mediation. These 
characteristics are: 1) conflict ripeness; 2) level of conflict intensity; and the 3) 
nature of the issues in conflict. On the other hand the characteristics of a successful 
international mediator proposed by Kleiboer are impartiality and motivations to mediate, 
leverage and status, they are discussed below  
2.1.1 Conflict Ripeness 
Proper timing of mediation initiatives as a relevant element to succeed has 
often been discussed. “It is assumed that conflicts pass through a life cycle that 
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encompasses a number of distinguishable phases, and that certain stages are more 
amenable to outside intervention than others” (Young 1967, p.19-20). 
 The assumption in particular is that in order for mediation to be effective it 
needs to begin at such ripe moments. Conflicting opinions exist, however, in 
reference to what constitutes such moments (Kleibore, 1994).  
Many argue that a conflict is ripe when: a mutually hurting impasse occurs, 
marked by “a recent impeding catastrophe occurs marked by a recent or impending 
catastrophe” (Zartman 1983, p.85; Modelski 1964, p.43; Pruitt 1981, p.17; and 
Assefa 1987, p.195). The efforts of both parties to impose unilateral resolutions are 
neutralized and bilateral solutions turn out to be possible leading opponents to 
perceive a workable alternative to war, and a power balance is altered affecting 
negatively the other party. The advantageous side starts perceiving weakness. 
According to Kleiboer (1994) other authors argue that the length of conflict 
is directly related to the persistence or change of attitudes of the adversaries toward 
the conflict. 
The classical view that endorses late involvement is that mediation has often 
seemed most effective when failure to reach an agreement is triggering a crisis, a 
perception of an emergency will intensely stimulate the  motivations of the 
recalcitrant parties to moderate their inflexibility as well as reconsider their 
demands (Northedge and Donelan 1971; Frei 1976; Rubin 1981; Moore 1987; Koh 
1990). But Edmead (1971) argues that mediation needs to begin at an early stage, 
which is well before any cycle of violence arises.  
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In contrast to the classical approach, in his research study of 257 
international mediation attempts, Bercovitch found that “the longer a dispute lasts, 
the less amenable it is to mediation” (Kleibore, 1996, p 363). On the other hand, 
“mediation efforts initiated between twelve and thirty-six months have proven more 
successful,” (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille, 1991, p.22). 
Kleiboer (1991, p.363) and Stedman (1996) see ripeness as a “function of 
internal political changes within groups in conflict, such as the emergence of new 
leaders, divided leaderships or a split in a government, previously unified in its wars 
aims”. And, a crucial element for the appearance of such ripe moments is “the 
developments within contending parties”. 
 
2.1.2 Level of Conflict Intensity 
The meaning of level of intensity remains ambiguous according to Kleiboer  
(1996, p.363). However, this author identifies this characteristic as the second in 
importance, “frequently alleged to affect mediation outcome”. The greater the 
intensity, the more the risk of polarization of positions among the disputants, 
causing a “greater predisposition to reject any mediation offer,” (Modelski 1964; 
Frei 1975, Brockner 1982 in Kleiboer 1996, p.363). 
 On the other hand, in his research on intensity, where “the number of 
fatalities experienced by each disputant is a variable”, he achieves empirical support 
for the hypothesis that: “as the number of fatalities in an armed conflict increase, 
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the likelihood that mediation will become successful suffers a consistent decay” 
Bercovitch, (1991, p.23). Therefore, the author suggests a different approach. 
Kleiboer (1996, p.364) argues instead that according to Jackson (1952) and 
Young (1967, p. 68) “the greater the intensity of a conflict, the higher the likelihood 
that mediation will be both accepted and successful as a method of minimizing 
losses”. 
Assefa (1987, p.194-195) asserts that “while the level of intensity 
continuously increases rather than stabilizes as war continues”, this however, is not 
an obstacle for the achievement of a mediated settlement. This author concludes 
that even deep conflict should not be disregarded as a candidate for mediation. 
 
2.1.3 The Nature of the Issue 
A last characteristic of the debate over the importance of various factors tied 
to the effectiveness of mediation concerns the nature of the issue.  Bertcovitch, 
Anagnoson, and Wille (1991, p.14), for instance differentiate between five issues: 
 “Sovereignty:  involving players with contrasting claims to specific territory, 
 Ideology:  focusing on the nature of a political system, basic values or 
beliefs, 
 Security issues: concerning frontiers, borders and territories, 
 Issues of self-determination, 
 National selfhood,  
 Independence conflicts and a residual category of other types of conflicts”. 
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Their research findings on this particular topic are that among the conflicts 
most amenable to successful mediation, the issues of territory or security are more 
important than ideology or independence.  
Fisher and Rubin adopt the idea that, “even if conflicting issues appear to be 
entirely zero-sum, it could be helpful to redefine or divide it into negotiable 
separate issues and to try to substitute those against one another” (Fisher 1971, 
p.141-2;  Rubin 1981, p.30).Druckman, Broome, and Korper (1988) “demonstrated 
that separating issues may be useful, if interests are decoupled from values. But, 
when conflicting issues at stake are originated from core value disagreements, 
disputes are challenging to settle” (Kleiboer, 1996, p.364). They also mention that 
other authors identify additional and relevant characteristics of a successful 
international mediation such as the dynamic between parties.  
For Kleiboer, academic debate in reference to mediation success and parties 
involved, it is emphasized by six characteristics:  1) parties identification, 2) 
cohesiveness, 3) type of regime, 4) motivation to mediate, 5) the distribution of 
power among them, and 6) previous and ongoing relationships. On the other hand 
according to Maria Carmelina Lodoño Lazaro in Effectiveness of International 
Mediation (2003, p. 328), argues that factors “related to their level of power, their 
political regime or previous relationship between the disputants” are critical to 
successful mediation. These characteristics are important to recognize, because they 
will help practitioners of foreign affairs and conflict resolution as well as other 
related scholars, mediators and other professionals involved in the Israeli-
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Palestinian mediation to understand how the dynamic of effective international 
mediation works in order to apply it successfully in the field. 
 
Identification of Parties 
The parties’ characteristics can be recognized in many ways; what is 
contested is which characteristics are tied to greater mediation effectiveness and 
how to anticipate effective mediation outcomes. 
For Kleiboer, in theory, consensus exists about that mediation would only be 
effective, if the disputing parties are explicitly classified and distinguishable by 
group’s characteristics and limitations. However, “this is problematic in practice” as 
stated by Kleiboer, and explained by Assefa (1996, p.365). 
Assefa (1987) observed that predominantly in situations of impromptu 
partisan violence, like uprisings or civil wars, the group’s identity of at least one of 
the players is often indescribable. ¨In these particular scenarios, there is no one to 
settle with” (Modelski, 1964, p.142). 
Another common issue, according to numerous historical cases of 
international mediation, is that “it is rather obvious to a third party who the 
disputants are, even though the parties themselves are refusing to identify and grant 
recognition to the opposite group as a legitimate participant whose needs and 
interests, as well as values, have to be taken seriously into consideration” (Hare 
1992, p.58). The Palestinian case has been often pointed to as an example of this 
phenomenon (Gazit, 1983). Kleiboer adds that, “even when disputants might be 
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clearly identified, these groups might often not act as an organized group, or not be 
recognized as such” (1996, p.365). 
 
Cohesiveness 
Kleiboer identifies cohesiveness in two ways. The first one refers to the 
“stability of the parties’ internal power structures (i.e., whether an identifiable 
leader or representative exists who has full authority to negotiate)” (Assefa, 1987, 
p.13).  
Also cohesiveness is “associated with the nature and quantity of the 
domestic constituency. This is particularly critical when a representative needs to 
deal with concessions without losing any of the constituencies; and create a need for 
mediation to take place not only among the adversarial parties but also among 
factions within the parties themselves” (Kleiboer, 1994, P.365). 
A particular scenario proves this argument. “When mediating the 1973 
Middle East crisis, Kissinger had to win over Sadat on the Egyptian side, whereas 
on the Israeli side he had to not only convince the Prime Minister, but the cabinet, 
the opposition and the press as well” (Kalb and Kalb, 1974, p.502; Rubin 1981, 
p.15). 
 Also, leaders within the non-cohesive side “are [often] more hostile and 
ready to provoke or escalate conflict with out-groups” (Bloomfield and Leiss 1969, 
p.27; Rabbie and Visser 1972; Fisher 1989).  “The presence of constituencies may  
provide for negotiators, who are recalcitrant to compromise, an opportune pretext 
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for resisting any mediation efforts to generate movement” (Kressel, 1981, p.231). 
Hoffman (1968) argued that “the greater the number of said constituencies, the 
easier it is for negotiators to invoke them to justify intransigence”, defined as 
“blackmail of weakness” (Kleiboer 1994, p.366).   This scenario is well illustrated 
by the United States’ mediation efforts in 1982, between Israel and Lebanon, on an 
Israeli withdrawal. “Lebanon could credibly threaten the collapse of the country to 
avoid the need to make concessions” (Inbar 1991, p.81), a continuous blackmailing 
from the Israeli side it is also alleged by Marwan Bishara, in his book 
Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid Occupation, Terrorism and the future (2002), or 
reflected by Ussamma Makdisin in his book, Faith Misplaced: The Broken Promise 
of the U.S. 1820-2001, (2010), who pictured a different scenario when Israel’s 
complained a blackmail from Palestinians to later seized 450 Palestinians from 
West Bank and Gaza. This research tried to identify academic opinions or 
allegations of Palestinian blackmail; however this is not officially documented. 
  
Type of Regime 
Regimes are frequently differentiated in terms of democratic versus 
authoritarian systems.  Among others, Maoz and Abdolali have argued that 
“democratic states may be as prone to conflict as any other type of regime” (Maoz 
and Abdolali 1989, 3-35). This proposition has found also a place in the mediation 
literature, alleging that mediation is mostly effective in conflicts affecting 
democracies.  
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In his research of 206 conflicts between two states, Raymond (1994) found 
that those of democratic systems were more predisposed than other type of dyads to 
trust mediators with judicial competence to mediate their conflicts (see also Dixon 
1993-94). 
Taking in consideration international sources, Bercovitch, Anagnosor, and 
Willie (1991, p.10) distinguish between five regime types:  1) monarchies, 2) one-
party states, 3) military regimes, 4) multiparty states, and 5) a residual category, as 
being an important factor in effective mediation.  Findings concluded that 
multiparty states, which are the most democratic type of regime, were somewhat 
with more disposition to mediate than non-democratic or authoritarian regimes.  In 
addition, it was found that “35% of the mediation efforts involving multiparty states 
were successful, in comparison with 6 % of the attempts involving one party state 
dyads” (Brecher 1993, p. 241-46). 
 
Motivation to Mediate 
Kleiboer maintains that the type of regime is not necessarily the most 
important variable for mediation. The degree of legitimacy may vary among 
regimes. Therefore, cohesion cannot be automatically conditional from regime type.  
However, the degree of acceptance as well as autonomy to maneuver that political 
leaders possess is, she argues, the most important characteristic. 
 
Balance of Power 
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In reference to this element, Kleiboer illustrates how there is no consensus 
about the nature of the effect on power parity between the disputants as asserted by 
some authors according to her. She adds that there is a diametrical opposed claims 
in reference to this in order to establish a clear parameter on this particular 
characteristic. In this sense, many (Young 1967, p.43-4; Zartman 1984, p.150; 
Kriesberg 1982, p.274; Toval 1982, p.9), argue that “anobvious power imbalance 
will strength the stronger party’s perception on the ability to ensure achievement of 
total victory, while reinforcing its unwillingness to mediate”. Modelski (1964, 
p.149) adds “the risk of a stronger party to use the mediator as an instrument for 
facilitating surrender, shown by Bertcovitch, Anagnoson and Willie” (1991, p.11). 
On the opposite side, Deutsch (1973, p.46), argues that ¨mutual recognition of 
differential power and legitimacy is what matters in conflict management¨.  
Finally, in the same analysis made by Kleibore, (Organski, 1960, p.293; 
Wright, 1965, p.441-2), claim the danger of power parity as this might lead to 
competition and escalation of conflict during attempts to recover power balance. 
Parties in an Ongoing Relationship  
Kleiboer (1996) sustains that parties are “far more interested and open to 
invest to preserve this relationship than those parties that have only a short term 
relationship” (Rublin 1981, p.38) and on the other hand, “parties with a history of 
friendship or cooperation will also approach emerging conflicts more 
cooperatively” (Deutsch, 1973).  As Kleiboer agrees, Yakamoto (1990), identifies 
friendship as an impediment for serious negotiations. 
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In contrast to Yakamoto’s argument, Bercovitch (1989) supports both 
assertions while his study indicates that the nations’ previous relationship influences 
the development of a conflict, however it only has a minor effect on its result. 
 
2.1.4 Characteristics of a Successful Mediator 
The mediator is always expected to play a relevant beneficial role, therefore, 
their characteristics play an important role in a successful international mediation´ 
(Londono, 1991) 
According to Maria Londono Lazaro (2003), as for Kleiboer, the mediator’s 
characteristics considered in her study as the most vital for the successful outcome 
of international mediation efforts are the characteristics a successful mediator 
should possess: 1) Impartiality, 2) Leverage, and 3) Status (Kleiboer, 1994).  These 
characteristics are “necessary for a mediator to be accepted by the disputing parties, 
which in turn, is seen as vital for the successful performance of his functions as a 
mediator” (Susskind and Babbitt 1992, p.35).  Even when “acceptability is 
portrayed as the characteristic that will differentiate mediation from other form of 
intermediary intervention in international conflict” (Mitchell and Webb 1988 p.4.), 
“the relationship between mediator/mediation acceptance by its participants, and its 
success, is more often postulated than empirically established” (Kleiboer, 1996, 
p.369). 
Impartiality 
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 The question over mediators’ impartiality has induced strong debate among 
scholars of mediation in foreign affairs. Theoretically, this is a complicated 
characteristic that often leads to misunderstanding or misperception since neutrality 
either refers to intention, appearance, or consequence (Kriesberg, 1982). 
Also, it is often linked to a mediator’s approach towards the conflicting 
nations, (Bjereld, 1995), or to the mediator’s stakes in particular scenarios in 
conflict, or to both (Princen, 1992). 
  There is one thing in which some analysts agree: “Impartiality is 
systematically a matter of perceptions of the parties in conflict” (Toval, 1975, p.55; 
Yarrow 1978, p.164; Bailey 1985, p.209-10).. The main debate on impartiality does 
not only refer to theoretical concerns, but focus on the consequences of impartiality 
on the outcomes of mediation. 
During the development of the debate in reference to impartiality, some 
analysts maintain that mediators’ success is not just conditioned upon impartiality. 
Some have examined whether additional mediators’ attributes such as the ones 
discussed in this thesis are more relevant in order to obtain more successful 
outcomes. Under the premises that a mediator employs a behavior designed to 
gather information and stimulate change of behavior on parties in order to reach 
agreements. In contrast to Kleiboer, who suggest that there is not conclusive results 
on the effectiveness of a bias or unbias mediator, Zartman and Toval (1985), as well 
as, Bertcovitch (1986), Princen (1992) and Savun (2008) maintains that the success 
of a international mediation does not necessary lies of an unbiased mediator, but on 
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resources capable to persuade one or both parties in conflict.   In other words, it is 
not impartiality, but leverage that should be considered when assessing success of 
mediation.  This idea is supported by empirical evidence from some authors such as 
Frei (1975, p.78) and Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991, p.14-5) (cited in 
Kleiboer, 2012). 
Leverage 
Leverage is one of the most ambiguous components of mediation. Its 
ambiguity makes it difficult for researchers to conceptualize but also to determine 
the importance of its role in a successful mediation. Some analysts go into too much 
detail on the definition of leverage, but overall, it seems to refer to a mediator's 
capability to persuade on one or both of the conflicting parties to agree to a 
settlement proposal. This assumes a mediator has the leverage to bear on the parties. 
However, it is inconclusive which means are critical in order for the strategy to 
succeed. Some “analysts distinguish between sticks (negative sanctions) and carrots 
(positive sanctions)” (Touval and Zartman 1985, p.13), and between material 
aspects (such as the possibility to withhold or supply economic aid) and immaterial 
aspects (the possibility to use moral or psychological pressure) (Princen, 1992, 
p.167). 
Lacking effective methodical assessment tools to measure the influence of 
these different means, there exist disagreements in the literature referent to the role 
of leverage in positive mediation’s results. According to some authors, “leverage is 
a necessary condition for mediation success” (Cot 1972, p.12; Brookmire and 
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Sistrunk 1980, p.326; Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991, p.15; Touval 1992, 
p.233). Still, these scholars, according to Pruitt’s findings in 1981 have proven in 
their empirical study that “leverage is essential to influence conflicting parties to 
make concessions or for ensuring that disputants adhere to their agreements” 
(Kleibore, 1996. P.371). Perhaps, “Kissinger's successes in the Middle East are a 
good illustration of the importance of being powerful” (Pruitt 198l, p.142). 
Status 
The formal rank of the individual in his or her organization, acting as 
mediator, expertise in negotiation and knowledge of the issues as well as its 
historical and political causes are among some of the important elements that 
measures a mediators’ status  (Pruitt, 2002; Svensson, 2009). 
Kleiboer offers two different hypotheses about the relations between this 
mediator status and positive mediation results. The first one discusses the extent of 
status required for effective mediation. Specialists affirm that the higher the 
mediator's status, the higher the probabilities of success in mediation. 
In a second proposition regarding the mediator’s relative status (the 
equilibrium between mediator and representatives), scholars maintain that in order 
for mediation to succeed it is vital that the mediator’s relative status be present, 
meaning that both, the representative and mediators, must be attuned.  On the other 
hand, according to Wolfers “it may be as problematic when the mediator's status is 
higher than the status of the representatives of the disputants” (Wolfers, 1985, 
p.185-86). 
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 According to Maria Carmelina Londono (2003) It is necessary to assess a  
mediator’s influence in the success of a mediation to evaluate the “ mediators’ skills,  
behaviors and attitudes, directly related to his/her role in the process of mediation” 
(p.33). In reference to the main characteristic of a successful mediator, chosen to be 
assess in this thesis, the literature reflects the following: 
 “The more committed a third party appears to be in fulfilling its promise to 
verify or enforce, the more likely the combatants are to sign and implement peace 
treaties” (Walter, 2002. p.166). “Current attempts at theorizing international mediation 
are problematic in various ways and recourse to more empirical analysis in insufficient 
to solve difficulties” (Kleiboer, 1994, p.11). According to Kleiboer third parties can play 
important roles in dealing with international disputes, both as crisis managers and 
conflict resolvers.  According to this author several characteristics of successful 
mediators have been identified by some scholars, such as Mitchell (1981) which are 
communication skills, flexibility in their thinking, judgment and knowledge about the 
conflict.  But, Kleibore sustains that “these are not the only preconditions for mediation 
success. The Mediator needs other critical properties. Particularly, he or she needs a 
commitment to peace and Justice” (Kleiboer 1998, p.54-56) . 
For Susan Allen, Nan Zacharian, Cherian Mampilly and Adrea Bartoli (2012), the 
key to the acceptance of a mediator is the credibility on the mediator’s role as 
intermediaries. But, this credibility is “often based on a sincere commitment” (p.187) 
among other elements not relevant to this research. According to these authors “ in 
contrast to other peacebuilding NGO’s, the community of Saint Egidio, has accumulated 
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significant political capital related to its capacity to accurately understand events, in light 
of decades long patterns, an advantage largely due to its commitment to peace work 
(p.119). 
     “A commitment to long term investment has allowed the Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue to engage in a proactive manner” (Griffiths, 2005), through “long term, 
rigorous and continuous engagement on the ground, cultivating and developing its 
reputation with relevant actors” (Edwards and Hulme, 1996). 
        Bercovitch (2002) sustains that “successful mediators engage properly in an 
intractable conflict setting while serving with commitment, persistence and experience” 
(James, 2012, p.119).  
As discussed previously, impartiality, as well as previous and ongoing 
relationship, are important to take in consideration when discussing any international 
mediation performance. Therefore, the influence on alliances to the role of mediators it 
is intrinsically necessary to be analyzed in this literature review in order to assess it 
fitness on a particular scenario related to the commitment of the United States as a 
successful mediator of this conflict. 
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2.2 Influence of Alliances in International Conflicts Mediators’ 
Role—a Theoretical Approach  
The theoretical core of this literature places alliances as an influential 
element on states’ behavior. This framework describes the capability aggregation 
model, which explains the causes and effects of alliances.   Institutionalist theories, 
on the other hand, have instead focus on the impact the institutions has on the 
behavior of the members themselves  neglecting the most important  institutions 
which address security issues of alliances. 
In contrast, “Realist theories of international relations have frequently 
denied that international institutions have any independent influence on state 
behavior. Therefore, as an alternative, one set of security institutions that scholars 
have paid attention to is alliances” (Gelpi, 1999, p.107). 
Gelpis’ findings indicate that realist and institutionalists propositions about 
the impact on alliances complement one another as the bases of effective mediation. 
Second, he explores the effect that alliances ties to the mediator have on the fact 
that the opponent nation will succeed in 117 of international crises scenarios. His 
findings challenge the hypothesis that the most successful mediators are weak 
neutral parties that abstain from using in coercive mechanisms. 
In this sense this author discusses three hypotheses: There is a direct link 
between an unequal alliance and the probability of mediation failure. The more 
unequal the more likely the probability that mediation will fail. On the other hand, 
in contrast to Gelpi who disagrees, Kleiboer maintains that there is a common 
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argument in the mediation research which suggest that weak states or weaken actors 
will be the most successful mediators. Additionally, Bercovitch and Houston (1996, 
p.27) found that ‘both the leaders and representatives of large states fare rather 
worse than expected as international mediators”.  
The legalistic view of mediation disagrees on coercive tactics, simply 
because they are a violation of the international law, which according to this 
perspective discussed by Gelpi can encourage agreements and peace.   In this sense 
he adds that, from a legal perspective, small states are expected to be successful 
mediators especially because of their weakness. According to this view, the most 
dangerous threat to diplomatic efforts in conflict resolution “is the illegal and 
illegitimate use of force” (Gelpi, p. 113) and small states mediators cannot use hard 
diplomacy and thus, the probability that they will stick to  legal precedent is higher, 
making then the most suitable to mediate. Similarly, he discusses the trust oriented 
approach to mediation which views force as damaging since it weakens trust and 
breaks communication between disputing parties and the mediator. Therefore, small 
states should be more effective in facilitating trust and communication when they 
refrain from threating either party. 
A second assertion made by this author is (Gelpi, 1999, p.113) is that those 
mediators, who possess higher military capability, will be more ineffective in their 
roles as mediators. The greater the mediator’s military capability, the lower the 
probability that mediation will be successful. In addition, a common argument in 
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the mediation literature is that coercive tactics by the mediator will reduce the 
probability of mediation success”. 
Similarly, Brouillet writes that the “mediators’ mission should be an 
endeavor to achieve a rapprochement” (1988, p. 171) 
Additionally, Gelpi adds that “The trust oriented approach emphasizes the 
loss of trust, increase of suspicious, and misperception which results from coercive 
tactics” (1999, p. 113). These theorists do argue that directive strategies are more 
successful in mediating agreements, than just consultation and facilitation of 
communication.  
 Gelpi (1999) Agree with Princen in the argument that  that active 
involvement by the  mediator in diplomatic crises contributed to mediation success, 
but the use of direct intervention and low or high coercive tactics by the mediator 
instead of moderate tactics, will be negative and lead to missed opportunities for 
peaceful settlement of disputes. Gelpi concludes with the argument of the existence 
of a curvilinear relationship between the coerciveness of the mediators’ strategy and 
mediation success. Furthermore, with the fact that a combined strategy of 
facilitation of an, open communication, with a moderate pressure to settle, are 
highly probable effective tools, while coercive tactics are ineffective. The result, 
neither extremely weak nor highly coercive strategies will be successful. However, 
the result of the third proposition, according to Gelpi, is a minority opinion that 
does not reflect the broad literature on international relations, but could be 
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important to analyze in future research in order to prove the effectiveness of this 
strategy in international mediation. 
Bercovitch (1996), Carnevale and Arad for example suggest that biased 
mediators will actually be more effective than neutral mediators. Toval (1982) and 
Princen (1992) also suggest that large states such as the United States could be 
successful mediators because of their capabilities to manipulate elements that could 
influence the disputants to settle. 
Despite these exceptions, Gelpi (1999, p.114) believes that hypotheses one 
through three reflect the expectations of the majority of the literature on 
international mediation. Moreover, they reflect the legalistic and trust based 
oriented framework that explicit or implicitly underpin much of the work on 
mediation. 
Realism had approached alliances as counterbalance of power and 
neutralization strategies against external threats, an aggregating military capability 
model, focusing on the external function of these institutions. In this sense, Gelpi 
has constructed a theory, incorporating realist as well as institutional theories of 
alliances, identifying them as intra allied control  (Gelpi, 1999, p. 107). 
 Realists’ notion that alliances are used as military power and control 
mechanisms Gelpi findings suggest that realist theory sees alliances exclusively 
thru the lenses of the capability aggregation model, used to “predict initiation, 
escalation and outcome of war” (Gelpi, 1999, p.109)  and argues that the role of 
alliances is not limited to this perspective, but it extends to several tasks as security 
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management institutions, while at the same time, these findings validates 
complementing with institutionalism’s argument about the role of these institutions. 
Additionally, this author examined the relationship between alliances and 
their roles as mediators in 117 international crisis cases between 1918 and 1988, his 
analysis revealed “direct evidence that alliance ties can be used to restrain alliances 
partners in these scenarios” (Gelpi, 1999, p.108).  Also, he was able to prove the 
accuracy of realism argument which asserts that “the role of power and military 
capabilities in making credible alliances commitments, effectives in altering state 
behavior and that they can be used as capability aggregation and deterrence 
strategies. Also, the effect that alliances have on the likelihood that the opponent 
will prevail as demonstrated in those same 117 international crises (Gelpi, 1999). 
These results show direct evidence that alliance ties are useful to contain allies in 
international crisis, but it also may be useful for other purposes not limited to the 
realist approach. 
For the above author, realism approach, which focus on these institutions 
through the lenses of the capability aggregation model, starts with the hypothesis 
that the states’s main goal  of forming an alliance is so that the allies can use their 
military capabilities to deter external threats, is correct when emphasizes the benefit 
of alliances as capability aggregation and deterrence tools, as well as, the role of 
military capability and leverage in, promoting credible alliances commitments, 
successful in influencing states’ behavior.   
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Within this context, scholars use alliance formation to predict the initiation, 
escalation and outcomes of wars.  Some have used game theory models to explore 
the deterrence capability of military alliance. Additional recent research has used 
related game theory models to define intervention in ongoing wars and to predict 
these conflicts outcomes. 
Consistent with Gelpi’s assertion that alliances performance is not limited to 
the capability aggregation model, Paul Schroeder describes alliances as tools to 
control their alliance partners. In this same context, “James Morrow has argued that 
it may involve an exchange of resources between allies rather than an effort at 
sharing capabilities”. (Gelpi 1999, p.109). He argues that “weaker states may trade 
their foreign policy autonomy for the security that a powerful ally may provide” 
(Gelpi, p. 110-111). However, most of these arguments do not focus on the 
influence of alliance as deterrence mechanisms, but, on the impact these alliances 
have on states’ relations. Therefore, in order to predict any behavior deemed to 
persuade allies’ behavior, Gelpi maintains that interaction between state’s alliances 
in scenarios where their interests are not compatible must be explored.  
One such set of circumstances to be study according to Gelpi, is the scenario 
in which the mediator of an international crisis is allied to one of the states in 
conflict. In such case he sustains that because the main goal of mediation in order to 
succeed is to find a solution to the dispute acceptable to both parties, the two allies 
will experiment conflicting interests. For those supporters of impartiality as an 
important characteristic of an international dispute’s mediator, the problem is that if 
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the disputants’ ally shared and supported the disputant’s interest entirety, this 
mediator will not act impartially, jeopardizing its role of neutral. Moreover, Gelpi 
adds that it is also possible, that an ally could simulate impartiality in an effort to 
persuade to guarantee a settlement by one of the parties in conflict. If the parties are 
aware of this it may affect their behavior, since they will only accept the mediation 
efforts if they share at least some interests. Therefore, when the mediation efforts of 
allied states are welcomed by the parties it is assume that there exist at least a 
combination of compatible and incompatible interests between both nations. For 
said reason the author investigates whether allied to at least one of the nations in a 
crisis are more effective in influence the parties to settle. 
Even more, according to Gelpi’s research, when the mediator is a great 
power, however, far from being detrimental when there exists a power imbalance 
between the ally nations (mediator-disputant), this has a powerful influence on 
mediation success.  Similarly, “a great power with ties that are two levels stronger 
to one disputant than the other is 18% more likely to be successful than a great 
power with alliance ties that are only unequal by one level. Great powers, with 
equal ties to both parties, are successful in mediating international crises only 31% 
of the time” (Gelpi, 1999, p.134). 
Finally, great powers which share a defense pact with one of the disputants 
and have no alliance with its opponent, are an additionally 14% more likely to be 
successful in their mediation efforts (Gelpi, 1999). The overall impact of alliance 
ties on the success of great power mediators is quite remarkable. Great power 
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mediators which have no alliances with one party, but have a defense treaty with the 
other,   have a 81 % effectiveness on this role (Haftendorn,  Keohane,  & Wallander, 
1999).   
Apparently, alliance ties facilitate the use of persuasion by great power 
mediators, intervention threats on unallied disputants and of abandonment of allies, 
asides from other advantages of security management. 
In this same source, Gelpi examines the impact that alliances ties to the 
mediator have on the probability that the challenger will prevail in the above 117 
scenarios. His analysis reveals direct evidence that alliances can be used to restrain 
allied partners in international crises, since allied can credibly threaten to punish 
their allied disputants if the settlement is violated. This author adds that these 
mediators shall be more competent to solve commitment problems of their allies, 
who are the disputants in the mediation. However, the United States commitment is 
being assess in this research which might negatively impact their efforts to 
influence their allies to mediate and commit to the process. 
In a different approach Stephen John Stedman, in Brown and de Oudraat 
(1996) argue that mediation efforts in intra-state disputes are resolved successfully 
only part of the time. He maintains that in the international arena the chances of 
success of mediation are greatest, first of all, when mediators have a clear strategy. 
Meaning, having: First, a “clear sense of what their political objectives are; Second, 
a plan for attaining these goals, and finally, international consensus of the vision” 
(Brown, 2001, p. 170). 
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However, sometimes they lack of a coherent plan.  By not having a clear 
strategy, lack of focus prevails, jeopardizing their commitment and the outcome of 
the process by the change of their foreign policy as a result of the natural alternation 
in the administration, in the case of democratic state mediators as the case of United 
States.  Also, for Stedman, a barrier for a clear strategy is, in some cases mediators 
act under the need to assist participants to avoid a humanitarian crisis and loss of 
innocent lives. 
Second, mediation efforts must be timed to coincide with moments when at 
least one and preferably all of the parties to a conflict prefer talking to fighting. 
Third, mediators need to have leverage over disputants, the more the better. 
Finally, at a minimum, mediators have to be willing to walk away from the 
mediation table. They need to convince their interlocutors that they will be left to 
their own.  
According to Wanda (2010), in his paper The Contribution of Social 
Constructivism, for Realism, the popularization of world affairs has been a crucial 
element  of it success for the last fifty years. However, the fall of the Soviet Union, 
lead to the end of the Cold War era in the late 1980’s, impacting, without question, 
the credibility of Realism. Smith has claimed it is due to the theory´s descriptive 
power, mainly assumed that the stability of the by-polar system is an enduring 
characteristic of global politics, evidenced by the failure of President George W 
Bush realist foreign policy.  
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Fukuyama in 1992  also “illustrates that according to realism, friends and 
enemies must to be chosen mainly on the basis of their power rather than on basis 
of the internal fiber of the government, something that social constructivism 
challenges and seek to correct in political science” (Wanda, 2010. p. 5) . Waltz 
identifies instead the unit of analysis for constructivism theory as the individual 
(Waltz 1998, p.38), while Wendt (1999) identifies the main unit of analysis for 
constructivism theory in international relations as the state. 
 “Constructivist approaches are unique in that they occupy a middle ground 
between rationalist/positivist and idealist/interpretive approaches to the study of 
international politics” (Adler, 1997, p.319).  Social Constructivism is a newly born 
paradigm that has been developed due to the need to either explain certain scenarios 
or filling the existent gaps, that other theories of international relations such as 
realism, liberalism has failed to explained as a result of its rigidity because of their 
oath of alliances to their discourses, a need that emerged as a result of a constant 
changing world. 
 
2.3 Culture—A neglected factor   
This section seeks to address the neglected factor of culture as it pertains to 
mediation, particularly by focusing on comparing between the effectiveness of 
American, Israeli and Islamic mediation techniques.  
In a study on the efficacy of the three international mediation approaches,  
Bercovitch offers a statistical analysis in support of the directive strategy as the 
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most effective conflict resolution tool in foreign affairs to mediate international 
disputes. His findings demonstrate that even when the communication facilitation 
strategy is the most frequently implemented in these cases is not the most effective 
one (Haixia 2007). However, according to Haixia, one weakness in Bercovitch’s 
study is its failure to compare communication, facilitation and procedural strategies, 
he simply takes for a fact that that the communication-facilitation strategy is the 
least effective one. 
For Haixia, the effectiveness of mediation does lies in parties’ consent to the 
mediator’s plan of action for conflict resolution efforts and not on mediator’s efforts 
per se.  He adds that the level of intervention theory also neglect a solid base to 
measure the real costs  providing only a subjective determination of a mediator’s 
level of intervention making Bercovitch’s classification of the different approaches  
not necessarily accurate. In addition, Bercovitch’s statistical analysis does not 
establish strong evidence for this idea. While, statistical results definitely shows that 
the directive strategy is most effective, there is a problem concerning the 
relationship between variables. The entire analysis of Bertcovitch fails to explore 
the relationship between dependent and independent variables. Therefore, his 
results lack of evidences to support his claim. 
Another theory among literature on this subject is that of the causal 
mechanism. According to Qi Haixia in his article A Comparison of the Effectiveness 
of International Conflict Mediation Strategies (2007), the supporters of this theory 
sustain that it is the casual mechanism linked to the three distinct strategies 
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(procedural, communication and facilitation) that dictate which is most successful.  
Even when, this author mentions some of this theory contribution, he does not 
clarify who are the supporters of this last statement and the research made for this 
thesis, did not find any support for this. However, Haixia mentions Elster (1989, 
1999); Stinchcombe (1991); Bunge (1997); Hedström and Swedberg (1998); Steel 
(2004); Mayntz (2004); Gerring (2008, 2010); Falleti and Lynch (2009); Hedström 
and Ylikoski (2010); and Grzymala-Busse (2011); as international relations scholars 
who have made important contributions to this theory. 
Additionally, Haixia maintains in the same article that the efficacy of the 
procedural strategy and the communication facilitation strategy is impacted by three 
variables: the situation, the intensity, and the extent of the conflict. These two last 
strategies are comparatively more effective in short term disputes, where the parties 
are not strongly balanced with one another than when trying to resolve protracted 
and intense conflicts. But, the directive strategy is evidenced to be the most 
effective of the variables discussed herein. 
 Mediation in some of the Middle Eastern conflicts between Israel and Arab 
countries, according to this author were selected for analysis in this research by 
Bercovitch, in order to determine the relationship between strategy and outcome. 
Findings indicate that “the Kissinger diplomacy remained effective for thirty three 
years, suggesting the long term effectiveness of the communication facilitation 
strategy. The effectiveness of Carter’s Camp David accords maintained during 
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twenty eight years, proves moderate efficacy over the long term of the procedural 
approach” (Haixia, 2007, p.620). 
 Haixia’s study found that over the short-term these three strategies’ 
effectiveness is placed in the following order:  directive, communication-
facilitation, and procedural. And, in the long-term, the order switches  to 
communication to facilitation and finally directive. In this study game theoretical 
analysis and a prisoner dilemma were the main tool applied to simplify the research. 
Much work remain to be done with respect to this subject,  the analysis need to be 
developed and enhanced upon through the implementation of  a broader range of 
tools. 
Further research need to be done in order to be able to outline in more detail 
the circumstances under which one strategy demonstrates to be more effective than 
other.  However, some limitations exist; uncertainty encompasses the norms and 
responses to conflicts. The lack of consensus about world order and normal conduct 
within it, besides confusion about commitments to enforce norms and limits of 
deviant behavior, have given rise to conflict in the new era. In reference to the level 
of commitment of mediators as a vital element for success, there exists an important 
gap in research, making difficult to persuade the foreign affair community of the 
need of it for mediation success. 
Spoiler Management 
A key element to contemplate in the establishment of durable peace for Evan 
Hoffman (2009) is the management of spoilers. 
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Stedman (1997, p.5)  defines spoilers as “leaders and parties who believe 
that peace emerging from negotiation threatens their power worldview and interests, 
as well as use of violence in order to undermine attempts to achieve it.” 
Furthermore, he   
identifies three major spoiler management approaches to consider: a) complying with  
spoilers’ demands and giving the spoilers what they want,  b)  modification of spoiler’s 
behavior changing the behavior of spoilers and/or c) coercion or punishment.   As 
Walther argues (1997, p. 18) 
 “The policy and academic literature houses two very different views about the 
kinds of diplomatic strategies most appropriate for dealing with Hamas. One 
school of thought stresses the complexity of the heterogeneous social movement. 
Its decision making process between hardliners and moderate leaders and their 
internal rivalries portraits Hamas as a pragmatic organization not committed to 
violence by nature, a social movement that can be included in negotiation. The 
second school labels the group as a terrorist organization whose desire for the 
elimination of Israel and embracing of violence pose an obstacle to the peace 
process.”  
He goes on to say that  
“the policy implication for the first school of thought is that Hamas cannot be 
reformed into a political party and will continue to use violence. Therefore must 
be neutralized in order to achieve any progress in the peace process, a recent 
policy followed by the quartet, implemented by the use of isolation and proven to 
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be insufficient to deal with Hamas.  A second school of thought focuses on 
Hamas’ ability to learn and develop new strategies, and its perilous ability to 
maintain a powerful position that is based on public support”  (p. 22). 
 Former U.S. president, Jimmy Carter, who headed a team of international 
election observers, in 2006, criticized the Israeli methods, sustaining that they would 
present:  “significant obstacles to the effective governance of the Palestinian territories”,  
and adding that “efforts by Israel or the U.S. to undermine Hamas would only bolster its 
standing both domestically and internationally” (Young, 2006, p. 15). 
The U.S. is seeking different approaches to promote a credible democratization 
agenda while dealing with Islamist militant groups. According to this author some critics 
of Western policy state that there are many apparent contradictions and inconsistencies 
such as: How Western policy can ask and claim for pluralism if they keeps ignoring, 
such as Hamas which has wide popular support? One question that should be asked 
concerns pluralism as Western policy.    
He also describes some other weaknesses of Western policies, such as neglecting 
the fact that Hamas is a “mass political movement with large-scale and growing popular 
bases, a reason why Western policies have not succeeded in their intention to weaken 
Hamas” (Tossi, 2007, p.1).  Rather than weaken Hamas, such policies have entrenched 
its popular legitimacy (Carter, 2006). 
Alastair Crooke, the Director of Conflicts Forum and a former EU negotiator 
with the Palestinian factions maintains that   Hamas has a pivotal political legitimacy, 
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more than any other ruling government in the Middle East. Also, he asserts that “the 
hostility and negativity towards the outcome of the elections will seem very perverse” 
(Smith, 2011, p.15), coloring as well as hindering engagement in the Middle East. 
However the Obama team had indicated that the possibility of a dialog with Hamas is 
not null. “The incoming Obama administration moved to abandon George Bush's 
doctrine of isolating Hamas by establishing a channel and open contacts with Hamas, 
which could be initiated through the US intelligence services, would represent a 
definitive break with the Bush presidency’s ostracizing of the group” (Mirault, 2010, 
p.44). “The collapse of the Oslo accords and the effective absence of other diplomatic 
efforts also helped bring about the Islamists change of heart. Hamas could enter political 
institutions without fear of endorsing a process that would profoundly divide the 
movement and force it to re-examine basic tenets.”  (p. 50). 
One can argue that the reasons why Hamas changed its opinions and decided to 
participate in the elections can be reduced to four main factors. The first one is 
international pressure. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, Hamas is under 
American pressure as well as international pressure. The EU listed the movement as 
terrorist, like Israel and the United States.  
The second relevant fact relates to the capacity and power of Hamas. Its leaders 
are conscious of their power. This enables them to take part in the political process. They 
lack this power ten years ago. A last argument is the war led by Israel for three years 
against Hamas, which enormously weakened the movement (Mirault , 2010). 
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For Marc A. Walther (2010, p. 429) “in general the situation leaves politics with 
three options. The first one is the rejection of Hamas as a political adversary and the 
attempt to marginalize or even eliminate it by isolation and military means”. For this 
author, military “force can contain, but not neutralize Hamas and the same account can 
be given to the isolation approach used from 2006-2008, both attempts proved to be 
unsuccessful”.  Moreover, he asserts that the supporters of the above mentioned 
approaches sustain that political participation of Hamas will not succeed unless the 
group is refuses the use of violence. Finally, he asserts that as his analysis shows, this 
assessment seems to be incorrect. 
The author alleges that current research show that inclusion can moderate 
extremism, even in non-democratic systems. While this does not mean that a movement 
experiences a full complete conversion at once, it shows that the process can succeed. A 
second option for Walther is Hamas’ acceptance in the political system, and negotiations 
without preconditions, a strategy to encourage Hamas to abandon its violent resistance 
methods, since these are more difficult to justify while involved with political 
participation,  The risk of this option for Western mediators to negotiate with Hamas, 
lies in “the difficulty of contradicting agreed upon political decisions, countering lobby 
groups which pressure for option one, while at the same time the risking  lack of 
guarantee that Hamas will stay peaceful” (Walther, 2010, p.139). 
 As a third possible alternative that Walther recommends in his thesis, including 
Hamas in an indirect approach “[aims] to create conditions that make it strategically 
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attractive for Hamas to abandon violence and accept a two state solution, giving the 
group an incentive to redefine violence toward political opposition” (Walther, 2010. 
p139-140). 
 The following chapter moves from an overview of the relevant literature to 
describe and assess American involvement (or lack thereof) in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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Chapter Three 
The United States of America and the Origins of the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
3.1 Historical American-Israel Ties 
A press release penned by White House Press Secretary Charles G. Ross 
(1945-1950) documents that in 1917 “Chaim Weizmann, a scientist, statesperson, 
Zionist movement leader in Germany, and first president of the State of Israel, 
influenced the British government to issue a statement supporting the establishment 
of a Jewish national home in Palestine. The speech, which became known as the 
Balfour Declaration, was, in part, compensation to the Jews for their endorsement 
of the British against the Turks during World War I. After the war, the League of 
Nations endorsed the declaration, appointing Britain to rule Palestine in 1922” 
(Ross, 1978, p. 469). This story, in addition to many others, suggests significant 
historical ties between the United States of America and the State of Israel.  
 This chapter focuses on the creation of the State of Israel, as well as the 
impact of U.S. administrations from President Woodrow Wilson through President 
Harry Truman over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A final subsection will cover a 
domestic level of analysis, a bureaucratic perspective of the U.S. administration 
during this period in the conflict’s development. 
 The article Woodrow Wilson and the Balfour Declaration, written by 
Richard Ned Lebow (1968), documents the active role played by the U.S. in the 
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creation of the State of Israel. According to this author, President Wilson had two 
major reasons for endorsing the Balfour Declaration which was proposed by British 
Secretary of State Balfour: 1) Sympathy for the Jewish peoples’ suffering, and 2) A 
calculation of strategic benefit; in other words, the more allies in the area, the better. 
On the other hand, President Wilson was concerned with the fact that the 
United States had never had a confrontation in the area and he believed that making 
the endorsement public might jeopardized its relationship with Turkey. Therefore, 
President Wilson offered his support to the Balfour Declaration, with the pre-
condition of not making this move public. 
According to Isserof in the same edited article (2003-2009), a demonstration 
of about 100,000 Jews gathered at the doors of the Consulate at Odessa, in support 
of President Wilson because of the rumor of his endorsement of the British proposal 
to make Palestine into an independent Jewish state, which led to President Wilson 
finally being persuaded to break his silence on his support to Zionism, and to admit 
the world of his endorsement of the Balfour Declaration on August 31, 1918.  
Wilson’s approval of the Balfour Declaration and his subsequent stand on 
his promise greatly strengthened the hands of the Zionists and were significant in 
securing the final settlement.  Finally, Isserof maintains that without the American 
Presidents intervention, the Zionists’ expectations would not be fulfilled and they 
could receive much less than they did. For all the reasons mentioned above, Lebow 
placed the name of former President Woodrow Wilson among the fathers of the 
State of Israel. 
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Other motivations for support of the creation of Israel have been mentioned 
by some authors, including Grose (1988). First, American support greatly 
strengthened the determination of the Jewish community in Palestine and a Jewish 
lobby around the world to pressure for the statehood solution. Second, it seriously 
jeopardized any resolution on the part of the other triumphant great powers at the 
moment (Britain and the former USSR), to impeded such a solution in Palestine. 
 Based on the Jewish Virtual Library (2011), there is lack of historical data in 
regarding the State of Israel’s creation and its impact on the Palestinians during the 
administrations of former Presidents Warren Harding (1921-1923), Calvin Coolidge 
(1923-1929) and Herbert Hoover (1929-1933). However, their pro-Israeli attitudes 
are reflected in two main quotes:  
President Harding (Bard, 1991, p.1) said “it is impossible for one who has 
studied at all the services of the Hebrew people to avoid having faith that they will 
one day be restored to their historic national home and their input on an new and yet 
greater phase of their contribution to the advance of humanity.”  
Calvin Coolidge in the same article and page expressed his “sympathy with 
the deep and intense longing which finds such fine expression in the Jewish 
National Homeland in Palestine.  Palestine which, was desolate for centuries, is 
now renewing its youth and vitality through enthusiasm, hard work, and self-
sacrifice of the Jewish pioneers who toil there in a spirit of peace and social 
justice.”  
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According to Grose (1988), U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt (1933-1945) 
was a big supporter of a Jewish state since the beginning of World War II until 
almost the end of his life. He maintains that Roosevelt expressed support for 
removing all Arabs from the land to create a Jewish State in Palestine, by what this 
Grose called the use of bribes and physical force, transforming the former 
presidents’ rhetoric and policies into what is called now Zionism. 
 By the end of his presidential term Roosevelt seemed to turn anti-Zionist, 
following a meeting with King Ibn Saud during the Conference of Yalta. 
Apparently, Roosevelt was completely touched by the arguments against the Zionist 
by the ruler and informed his change of policy to the U.S Congress in March, 1945 
in a speech that “sent shivers down the spines of American Jews, and stunned even 
his own advisors” (Grose, 1988, p.37). 
 After his meeting with King Ibn Saud, President Roosevelt was convinced 
that his plans for Palestine would end in significant bloodshed between Arabs and 
Jews. He took a neutral position by handing over such responsibility to the then 
recently created United Nations, under the argument that resolving the Palestine 
issue, was not in control of the United States and Great Britain and that such 
responsibility instead lied with said international body. This created confusion about 
commitments to enforce norms and limits of deviant behavior. 
Grose sustains that according to many authors, the Holocaust obviously also 
played an important role in the creation of Israel, by generating a sympathy for the 
Jewish suffering, as well as Jewish determination to get their own land and survive.  
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In 1941, during U.S participation in World War II, Franklin Roosevelt, in his own 
words, said that “Palestine should be made into an exclusive Jewish territory” 
(Grose, 1988, p. 39), transforming his rhetoric and policies to be almost wholly pro-
Zionist .   
With the UN Partition Plan for Palestine of 1947, the Arab League held a 
series of meetings concluding with the resolution to encourage Arab armies to 
invade Palestine in order to protect its territory and people, which led to the first 
Arab- Israeli War of 1948, resulting in the division of Palestine, with an important 
part under seized by Israel, and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, under 
Jordan’s control, while Gaza strip by Egypt (Grose, 1988).  
This course of events gave hope to Zionist Jews about the possibility of the 
establishment of their own state, encouraging the mass immigration of many Jews 
from around the world to Palestine, particularly Germans running away from the 
Holocaust, raising Arab’s concerns. This triggered guerrilla attacks leading Britain 
to take the decision of restricting Jewish immigration into Palestine in 1939. Jews 
interpreted this act as a betrayal, creating resistance to the policy and the 
intensification of seeking for support from the United States.  
While President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave a sympathetic perception to the 
Jews for their struggle, his non-intervention promise to the Arabs, and prior 
consulting both affected people and triggered public concerns about his 
administration’s ‘real’ policy towards the issue.  
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Finally, Ami Isserof (2003) added a third reason for American support for 
the Balfour Declaration: the decisions taken by an unexperienced Vice President 
Truman, who became president just as a result of political pressure after the passing 
of elected President Franklin D Roosevelt.  
The Truman administration policy supported the idea, arrived at through 
situational analysis, that the Jews were oppressed people in need of a homeland. 
Throughout the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, the Departments of War and 
State, under the suspicion that there was a possible Soviet-Arab alliance which 
might potentially affect U.S interests by restricting the supply of oil to the U.S., 
recommended to the U.S. a policy of non-intervention in favor of the Jewish people.  
Reactions to the policy in question on the side of the Arabs, Jews, and 
British did not wait. The British role was antagonized as a result of Jewish terrorism 
and by 1947 Arab-Jewish relations had broken. This turn of events lead Great 
Britain to request on April 2, 1947 for the U.N. to intervene by creating a 
Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). Once the committee was formed, it 
recommended an autonomous (without a British mandate) two-state solution. A 
decision that was hardly rejected by top ranking U.S. Department of State officials, 
since it was taken unilaterally without any prior consultation by President Truman. 
On May 15, 1948, the first year for the independence of the State of Israel, the 
Israeli-Palestinian war began with the invasion of Israel by Arab armies. 
History shows that, besides Wilson’s lack of knowledge and experience in 
foreign affairs, consistent with Zartman’s theory, as well as the lack of commitment 
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from the administrations of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, and finally an 
unexperienced Vice President Truman, who became president by accident, was 
among the most important reasons for failure to prevent conflict. 
 
3.2 The U.S. Recognition of Israel—A Domestic Bureaucratic 
Perspective 
A domestic level of analysis on the U.S. recognition of Israel and the role of 
President Truman during the event which directly impacted the conflict is made by 
Nilay Saiva (2005) who states that “American foreign policy is not the product of 
reactions to foreign affairs, but, a result of process”. Foreign policies arise from an 
interaction between diverse organizations, rival interest groups, and perceived roles 
in administration giving. Due to these competing bureaucratic pressures President 
Truman had no option but to make, the decision to recognize or not to recognize 
Israel, being probably the most important decision during his presidential period.     
While pressured by George Marshall and Loy Henderson key persons within 
the State Department at the time not to compromise the U.S status in the Middle 
East. Furthermore, Marshall and Henderson as well as other key advisor’ biases 
were obvious, when expressed the concern on a possible threat from the Zionist 
movement communist and socialist in nature. However, the real problem the U.S. 
faced in  bipolar world, where the competition with the Soviets was high, was the 
URRSS was open to recognized Israel and intervened on their behalf while the 
United States remained apathetic. They justified the decision based on national 
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interest in terms of both U.S status before the international community and 
domestic interests. . 
On the other hand, the president faced the challenge of political liability at 
home for not recognizing the state, Jewish lobby pressure from both within and 
outside the White House and finally a continuous barrage of Jewish lobbyists 
demanding the creation of a Jewish state.. Besides Truman’s own Zionism’ support, 
additional inside lobby from aides like Clifford, Niles and Lowenthal worked hard 
to support the cause.  
Truman’s decision rose from bureaucratic politics with contrasting concerns 
directing the White House and the State Department over Palestine. The lack of 
consensus and clashes led to an unclear and at times incoherent Middle East policy, 
while under the predicament of having to consider reports from Niles, Clark, and 
Lowenthal, against recommendations from Marshall, Forrestal, Acheson, and 
Henderson. Besides, he needed to deal with the Defense Department, Department of 
State, National Security Council, and Central Intelligence Agency, to, finally, had to 
hear requests from the Jewish lobby and the Washington oil lobby as well. 
The administrative disaster mirrored the struggle in the Truman 
administration, when even the own Truman, admitted the perception he had, of a 
conspiracy against his administration’s policy. He also went further to recognized 
that a partition plan was not the solution to the ongoing battles in Palestine, but at 
the same time he wanted to prevent blaming on him for disengaging from mediation 
efforts for what he fought hard.   But, his argument is challenged by Villanova 
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(2004), who argued that Truman’s decision to recognize Israel, was not more than a 
protest to domestic pressure on him, specifically from the Department of State.  
This bureaucratic instability caused by the U.S. recognition of Israel 
originated from the different conflicting risks, interests and perceptions of its 
participants   And the problem continued “as career officials and political 
appointees continue to resist presidential decrees, modern presidents have 
responded by seeking to accumulate and centralize power in the White House. This 
problem is summarized in Truman’s memoirs” (Villanova, 2004, p. 18). 
It seems like the Truman administration’s main challenge was bureaucracy, 
one in which many career officials picture themselves as devoted to government 
management and policymaking, challenging the President, who has to deal with 
many trying to bypass their policy, something achieved by the bureaucrats, often by 
persuading the key officials, appointed by the president to take the responsibility of 
policies’ implementation. According to Truman, this is illustrated in the own 
generals and admirals of the War and Navy Departments at the time. For him, the 
main obstacle to making foreign policy was that, frequently career men instead of 
implementing the administration’s policies, they usually sought to impose their own 
visions. They succeeded in having the Secretaries act for and under the 
bureaucracies, as he experienced with the Department of State. Bureaucracy was 
definitely an issue for President Truman, creating an inconsistent policy condemned 
to failure. 
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For the reasons given above, President Harry Truman failed to follow the 
advice of almost every foreign policy expert within his circle of influence at both 
the domestic and international levels. They had predicted a disastrous result for 
such a move. What follows in the next chapters endorses the prediction of Truman’s 
advisors. 
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Chapter Four 
The U.S. Role and Status as Mediator in the  
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
 
4.1 The Effectiveness of International Mediation 
Before identifying the U.S. role as mediator in the conflict, it is important to 
explore what a good practice constitutes as well as establish the parameters of 
success in international mediation. This chapter will discuss this, and apply it to the 
roles played by various U.S. administrations in this international dispute between 
1950 and 1970. 
For Michael E. Brown and Chantal de Jonge Outdraat, even when some 
policymakers see mediation as a panacea, the fact of the matter is that mediation 
efforts in intra-state disputes are successful only part of the time. For these authors, 
there are some preconditions in order for mediation to succeed. 
First, mediators should have a clear strategy, meaning having specific 
political objectives, a plan for attaining these goals, and an international consensus 
of their vision. Second, mediation efforts should be ripe, meaning they should 
coincide with moments when at least one and preferably all of the parties to a 
conflict prefer talking to fighting. Third, mediators need to have leverage over the 
disputants.  Finally, opportunities for success increase when mediators are in a 
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position to offer an inducement if a settlement is reached, and to use hard 
diplomacy if not. 
As discussed in the literature review, Stedman’s argument coincides with 
that of Michael E. Brown and Chantal de Jonge Outdraat, that in the international 
arena the chances of success of mediation are greatest when mediators have a clear 
strategy.   However, this author specifies the meaning of clear strategy, which is 
having a clear sense of what their political objectives are, a plan for attaining these 
goals, and international consensus of the vision. On the other hand, Maria Londoño 
agrees with Kleiboer in that, “the mediators attributes considered in the literature as 
the most important for the success of mediation are: impartiality, leverage and 
status” (Maria Londoño Lazaro 1991, p.331). 
For Susskind and Babitt “These characteristics are usually held responsible 
for a mediator becoming accepted by the disputing parties, which in turn, is seen as 
vital for the successful performance of his mediator functions” (Kleiboer, 1996. p, 
368)  
 
4.2 Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (1950-1970)   
During this period, U.S. participation was via joint effort rather than as a 
main protagonist in mediation. By 1950, intense clashes had occurred among 
infiltrated and displaced Palestinians and Israelis, leading to several Israeli 
casualties. In the middle of such heat the United States efforts along with Britain 
and France focused on monitoring and control arm shipments to both sides as 
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conflict prevention measure while also proposing peace talks under the Anglo 
American initiative.   
“During the 1950s and 1960s, the structural asymmetry between the two 
parties became an extremely relevant characteristic of this conflict. While 
the state of Israel was able to build the strongest and best-equipped army of 
the Middle East, the Palestinians could only create armed groups that carried 
out resistance actions, sometimes of a terrorist nature, both inside the 
territory of Israel and against Israeli (but also Jewish) targets abroad” (Gallo 
and Marzano, 2009.p. 43). 
A major initiative during 1955 and 1956 was Project Alpha, a joint U.S.-
British comprehensive peace proposal that would comprise agreements between 
Israelis and Arabs, the resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem and diplomatic 
exchanges. However, this effort failed, ending in a revival of violence, mainly due 
to Israel’s domestic political instability, and sanctions were placed against Israel by 
Egypt creating a blockage that intensified Arab border strife. 
The following period left an opening for the United States to take the lead in 
mediation efforts. 
 
4.3 Timeline of U.S. Administration Mediation Efforts 
4.3.1 Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration (1953 – 1961) 
During this administration, the Jewish American community’s contact with 
the White House was very limited. According to a political historian of the 
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University of California, Steven L. Spiegel, “his administration considered Pro-
Israeli pressure an obstacle to overcome rather than as a factor in formulating 
policy” (Verbeeten, 2006, p. 39) and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was 
particularly firm in ignoring the pressure exercised by Jewish groups. 
Between 1953 and 1956 the administration’s perception of Israel was 
negative, despite the efforts made by the Israel’s sympathizers. Different 
presidential documents such as debate conversations, reports and memos, by U.S. 
officials, illustrated that the Jews and not the Arabs were the main obstacle to peace. 
U.S.-Israel relations were characterized by tension and disagreements. Both nations 
felt their national interests were different. While the United States expected Israel to 
concede territory, cease raids, restrict immigration, and accept the return of 
refugees, Israel refused to do so. 
 The Eisenhower administration was aware it had an unbalanced policy 
toward Israel. However, it did justify its position under the argument that closer ties 
with the Arab states was among its interest in the region.  
The British decision to disengage created the risk of a vacuum, and 
sharpened the United States’ desire to merge the Arab world into its standards. But, 
it refrained to do so, in order to avoid any policy that might justify the Arabs who 
were obsessed by the perception of U.S. preference towards Israel. 
Calculating that Israel would make broader shifts to the Gamma and Alpha 
plans, facilitating a land bridge between Jordan and Egypt by ceding Negev 
territory, Eisenhower’s administration denied Israel arms, and threatened the 
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country with economic sanctions. Furthermore, neither Kenen’s objections to 
President Eisenhower’s policies nor AIPAC (American Israel Political Affairs 
Committee, a key pro-Israel lobbying group) were able to influence the general 
orientation of Eisenhower’s policy. 
A significant policy of President Eisenhower was his focus on not getting 
the country involved with becoming Israel’s major supplier of armament. The 
administration wished to avoid this in an effort to maintain some independence 
from Israel and attempt to serve as an honest broker for peace. 
 The Eisenhower period was the low water mark for U.S.-Israel alliance. The 
president was guided more by issues of international politics and containment 
strategy than he was to domestic pressure even within his own political party. One 
of his advantages was his lack of political vulnerability which had hampered 
Truman. He did not need the Jewish vote in order to win the elections. However, the 
U.S. facilitated a French-Israeli alliance that promoted the acquisition of armament 
for Israel, as well as intelligence sharing that later became fixtures and in large part 
shaped the subsequent relationship between Israel and the United States. 
 An important event that shows this administration’s leverage was the capture 
by Israel of the Gaza territory. President Eisenhower was facing important domestic 
as well as international pressure, due to election campaign and the Hungarian 
revolution. The opportunity arose for Israel in a coalition with France and Britain, 
to seize the Gaza strip.  
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But, instead of using the tactics of economic sanctions or any other 
manipulations, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
condemned the attack before the United Nations, where France and Britain held 
veto power in the Security Council, in conjunction with some emerging third world 
governments. The matter was taken to the General assembly which approved 
resolution after resolution calling for a ceasefire and then withdrawal of the 
aggressor. After a series of pressure tactics from the U.S., the occupation of the 
Gaza strip came to an end. 
It was not until 1960 that the United State intervened directly for the first 
time with its mediation efforts as conflict was escalating. 
4.3.2 Peace Efforts of  the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations 
(1960-1971) 
During this period, many scholars contend that the Americans’ impartial 
approaches toward Arab Israeli conflict’s resolution were neutralized by domestic 
politics in the United States, domestic ethnic politics, Middle East big power’s 
competition and the growing distrust between Arabs and Israelis. President 
Kennedy, like several other American presidents, stressed the importance of the 
Arab refugee problem, but his efforts to break the impasse did not succeed. As 
Drucks wrote ¨while Kennedy administration supported Israel, it did not wish to 
provide Israel with a bilateral alliance since it might only serve to bring Arab states 
such as Egypt closer into the soviet orbit” (2001, p.6).    
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After the failure to avoid the outbreak of the June 1967 war, President 
Johnson efforts were focused on preventing a super power impasse thru direct 
negotiations with Russia to find a solution to the conflict. The basic elements of 
Johnson’s approach to the crisis of May 23rd were to persuade Israel to avoid war, 
and to refuse support of any the territory captured as a result of war (Peretz, 1972).  
However, records show that U.S commitment problems to prevent and 
manage the Israel-Palestinian conflict began during this administration, as then 
President Johnson was prioritizing his domestic interests, and the Vietnam War 
became the number one priority. Once the Six Day War began, sympathy for the 
Jewish people, and the desire to avoid damaging America’s image in front of some 
pro-Western oil-rich Arab countries as well as the extremely pro-Israeli tone of 
American public opinion helped make Johnson turn into a cautious, reluctant leader 
in the crisis. However, the efforts to implement what became policy in the U.S. the 
Council Resolution 242 were undermined by the continued attacks in the area, by 
the Arabs resisting to negotiate a peace with Israel and in the area, and finally, by 
Israel’s refusal to desist its occupation from Palestinian territory under the argument 
of their right to protect themselves from further aggression.  
According to Peretz, the Nixon administration continued to approach the 
resolution efforts similarly to Johnson’s administration, but its passive style to break 
the impasse were unsuccessful. By 1967 the conflict experienced a new phase 
centering on the assessment of a possible exchange of captured territory for 
ceasefire, this time in the absence of an active role by the U.S. However, this new 
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initiative also failed, increasing tension among  rival Palestinian factions leading 
ultimately to a civil war mainly mediated by Anwar Nasser, President of Egypt at 
the time, followed by UN efforts which were rejected by Israel as infringing on its 
sovereignty.  
The Rogers’ Plan, Nixon Administration (1969) 
On December 9, 1969, in an effort to reach a settlement of the conflict, 
American Secretary of State Rogers under Nixon administration, made a public 
statement suggesting the possibility of peace by granting recognition to Israeli 
sovereignty in exchange of return of all seized territory to the Palestinians. On 
August 7, 1970, following the announcement of the Rogers plan, Israel started a 
cease fire which was quickly broken. As the Roger plan did not materialized, it was 
evidently a failed concept. “The Roger’s plan demonstrates how moderate the short 
term effectiveness of communication facilitation actually is, as the plan could not 
proceed without Israel’s participation in the peace negotiations .(Haixia, 2007, p. 
613). 
4.3.3 Carter Administration (1977- 1981) 
Clyde R, Mark (2002) from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
described the Jimmy Carter’s administration as a very dynamic one, referring to its 
involvement as a mediator of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, bringing as a 
consequence some disruption in the U.S – Israel bilateral relation. However, the 
Middle East Policy Council suggest that President Carter’s efforts to reach a 
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comprehensive resolution since 1997, did not only experimented some setbacks, but 
also advances in the process.  
The Camp David Accord  
The Camp David Accord was an effort to end the Arab-Israeli conflict and it 
was held between July 11 and 25, 1978, at Camp David near Washington, DC. It 
was the result of fourteen months of diplomatic efforts concentrated on planning a 
comprehensive settlement to the conflicts between Israel and the Arab countries. 
The resolution consisted of three parts, being the establishment of an autonomous 
self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as negotiations to 
solve the Palestinian problem (Stein, 1999). This process created a mixture of 
reactions, some in Israel perceived it as a U.S. strategy to pressure Israel to return 
the seized territories and to sacrifice something in good faith in the name of peace, 
in contrast President Carter’s endorsement to the Palestinian homeland and political 
rights triggered some friction with Israel, but for others the agreement simply 
reduced the need for commitment of Israel to negotiate with Palestine. This process 
was viewed by some in Israel as creating U.S. pressure on the Jewish state to 
withdraw from captured territories and to take risks for the sake of peace. Some 
others argue that the concluding version of the Camp David Accords denoted Israeli 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s success in limiting Israel pre-conditions to go to 
the negotiation table with the Palestinians. 
 However, for Yoav Tenembaun (2002), a lecturer at the University of Tel 
Aviv, the Camp David summit did not present a blue print for peace or specific 
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terms for an agreement. Instead it provided for active mediation between the 
parties, which was in contrast to Kissinger bargaining triad and partial strategy, an 
approach, failing to make progress. 
 Finally, Carter experimented with a bargaining triad, leading to the 
successful Camp David Accords. This accords, for Lt. Col. Richard C. Crotty, U.S. 
Army (2003, p.1), “has been extremely successful and productive for twenty three 
years”. According to this author the Accords established the basis for peace by 
encouraging negotiations concerning Palestinian statehood. However, efforts by the 
U.S. and Israel to follow through on this agenda were unfruitful. . 
During Carter’s administration, peace was achieved through the Camp 
David Accords, ending a state of war between Israel and Egypt, providing the 
foundation for an outline to a peaceful settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
proposing the creation of a Palestinian state.  According to this framework, parties 
shall agree to establish self-governing authorities, define and their powers and 
responsibilities. 
However, following the ratification of the Camp David Accords, the Israeli 
government came under intense domestic and international pressure to abort the 
plan for a Palestinian state. Then the U.S-Israelis were disrupted immediately by 
differences on the timeline to interrupted Israeli settlements on the West Bank. 
Consequently, the peace process that showed to be promising for the region, and the 
Palestinians, failed by 1980 leading to the 1980’s Palestinian uprising known as the 
first intifada, followed by a second uprising. Haixia (2007) findings show that the 
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effectiveness of Carter’s Camp David Accords ranks second at twenty eight years, 
indicating “moderate effectiveness over the long term of the procedural strategy”. 
(p.620) 
4.3.4 Reagan Administration (1981 – 1989) 
During the Reagan administration Israelis supporters were alarmed during 
the first Reagan term about potential frictions to the U.S.-Israel relations in part 
because several presidential appointees were related to key Arab nations. However, 
“President Reagan’s personal support for Israel and the compatibility between Israel 
and Reagan perspectives on terrorism, security cooperation and the Soviet threat, 
led to dramatic improvements in bilateral relations” and in 1981 both nations signed 
a cooperation agreement to enhance their national security.(Canfield, 2001, p. 20). 
In November of 1983, the two sides deepened their ties by forming a joint 
political military group to implement most provisions of said alliance and planned 
joint military exercises and facilities to stockpile military equipment in Israel. 
According to Bard Mitchell in his article, “Reagan’s Legacy on Israel” (2004), 
policy differed during 1982, when Reagan did not hesitate to publicly punish Israel, 
after Israel annexed the Golan Heights in 1981, suspending the strategic 
cooperation agreement and the delivery of F-16 jet fighters to Israel after the raid on 
Osirak, penalties that were put in place only temporary in both circumstances. As 
noticed herein, this did not impact the administration’s partiality for Israel and the 
weight it placed on Israel’s importance to the United States.  
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U.S.-Israeli ties strengthened during the second Reagan term, which 
included the grant of aid to Israel and a free trade agreement signed in 1985. 
However, while Reagan was an important ally to Israel, his administration also 
engaged in the most public criticism of Israel.  
On September 1, 1982, Reagan expressed his opposition to the creation of a 
Palestinian state, while supported the idea of self-government under the control of 
Jordan. He maintains the idea of an undivided Jerusalem, but suggested a 
negotiation on the final status, settlement freeze and disregard any suggestions on 
the return to the 1967 borders, a proposal rejected by Begin since it opposed and 
deviated from the Camp David Accords, totally disappointing president Carter. 
“In March 1985, President Reagan was on record saying, that the United 
States did not want to participate in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, despite the 
Camp David commitment for the United States to be a full partner in subsequent 
phases of the peace talks” (Quandt W, 2001 p. 262). In this particular quote. Quandt 
sought to emphasizes the need for a serious commitment from the United States to 
facilitate a two state solution. 
4.3.5 Bush Sr. Administration (1989-1993) 
The Bush administration exemplified a relevant ideological perpetuation of 
the previous eight years. However, he wanted to play a much audacious role than 
the preceding administrations towards peace in the Middle East, especially one that 
could guarantee Israel’s survival while providing a home to the Palestinian at the 
same time. But, he had to deal since the beginning of his presidential period with a 
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series of setbacks in the peace process, particularly the U.S. relation with Palestine 
as a result of his harsh policy referring Palestine when approaching the violence of 
the intifada. Kathleen Christison (1999), a Middle East analyst for the CIA during 
Bush administration , compared Bush and Reagan’s policies on this issue and she 
maintains that the reason why both differed diametrically, was the fact that Bush 
administration policymakers were not as Pro Israeli as Reagans and she highlights 
the neutrality of his approach not out of sympathy but, due to a lack of a clear 
strategy in the Middle East, especially at the beginning of the period, Christison is 
cautious to clarify that this  was not due to any sympathy for the Palestinian 
suffering in the intifada, but to the lack of a strategic vision the Bush foreign policy 
team had for the Middle East, after a cold war era.   
Another relevant factor in the pragmatism of the Bush administration was 
the bureaucratic influence of a Israeli lobby, especially within the close circle to his 
Vice President Baker whom feared that an Arab lobby within the U.S Department of 
State and within the rest of the bureaucracy could succeed in the shifting of the 
current policies at the time for one that would be more convenient to the Arab 
people,  The consequence was the relaxation of the pressure mechanisms on  Prime 
Minister Shamir and the ruling coalition, neglecting Israel expansion policy over 
the territory. 
Although a lack of a clear strategy was a reality for the Palestinian question 
right away, Secretary Baker presented one over the first ninety days of their 
administration outlines in the April 12, 1989 memorandum to the president. Even 
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though the content remains classified, the National Security Council cover sheet 
shown that the new administration's policy in the region would be generally 
consistent with what Baker and Dennis Ross, Director of Policy Planning for the 
State Department, pictured. According to Enrique Arduengo, (2009, p.4) “Baker 
was determined to resist the siren call of Israel and its Arab neighbor particularly 
when it seemed that neither side was interested in considering the delicate political 
choices necessary to create a real process”. 
In Baker’s view, a final settlement should include an autonomous 
democratic Palestine, monitored for security purposes by the UN or any other 
international force. The reaction from high Israeli officials was much curter, 
perhaps Moshe Arens, the Israeli foreign minister, expressed serious frustration with 
the content and tone of the discourse.  
According to Thomas L. Friedman (1989), in an article for The New York 
Times, “although the Secretary of State’s remarks were consistent with longstanding 
American Policy in the Middle East, they nevertheless were a departure from the 
Reagan administration in both tone and structure”. 
 The Madrid Peace Conference Effort  
A conflict resolution effort led by the United States, and hosted by Spain in 
Madrid on October 30, 1991, was aimed at establishing a peace plan between Israel 
and its neighbors. It included a plan for Palestine self-rule in the West Bank and 
Gaza, which would later “become permanent regional concerns such as: The fate of 
the Palestinian Refugees” (Ceri, Av, 1991, p.1). 
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The conference did not meet the aspirations of substantial agreement and 
failed to build strong domestic coalition to support it strategy. However, it 
represents a huge step to the broker role of the United States of America. It reunited 
for the first time Israelis and PLO negotiators, giving them the opportunity to 
experience independent negotiation, which finally resulted in the Oslo Accord.  
After the Madrid Conference in 1991, bilateral and multilateral negotiations 
were launched. However, for Scott Lansenky in his article Negotiating Arab-Israeli 
Peace; American leadership in the Middle East, election years in Israel and the 
United States, the Bush Sr. administration’s ability to play an active third party role 
was limited as evidenced by Secretary Baker’s lack of involvement in the process 
following the Madrid negotiations, documenting one more time a serious 
commitment problem on behalf of the U.S in their mediator role 
On March 6, 1991, President Bush outlined a framework for peace which 
was grounded in U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle 
of territory for peace, On March 6 1991, President Bush suggested a new proposal 
for peace, contemplating both sides, the recognition of Palestinian political rights as 
well as Israel’s national security grounded in U.S S.C Resolutions 242 and 338 as 
well as the principle of land for peace. Also, Secretary Baker delivered non-binding 
letters of assurance to all parties that were not officially released. 
Baker apparently agreed with Israel’s opinion that SC Resolution 242 was 
subject to interpretation, asserting that the U.S would give considerable weight to 
Israel argument that the Golan Heights was an essential element for its security and 
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stated that the United States would not endorsed the creation of an autonomous 
Palestinian State.   Finally, he assured the Palestinians that the United States support 
the idea of legitimate political rights for Palestinians, opposing Israel’s annexation 
of East Jerusalem to their territory. The process experienced a setback; negotiations 
froze, breaking down on the issue of sovereignty. Palestinians wanted territorial 
sovereignty that Israel refused, but, the U.S. was willing to support. Therefore, the 
U.S. used financial leverage to stop settlement. 
Prime Minister Shamir’s obstinacy with regard to the peace process directly 
impacted the following election and the Labor party returned to power. Yitzhak 
Rabin became Prime Minister of Israel in August 1992, and assured President Bush 
that he was determined to make real progress in the peace process; The Bush 
administration did not vacillate in grating the guarantees that had so evaded Shamir 
over the course of the year. The Middle East team at the U.S. Department of State 
immediately got the impression that Rabin was needed for conflict resolution efforts 
to move forward. 
4.3.6 Clinton Administration (1993-2001) 
President Clinton opinion is that “only the region’s leaders can make peace, 
and vowed to be their partner” (Migdalovitz, 2002, p.5). However, in her issue brief 
for U.S congress this analyst affirms that after the Hebron protocol was 
implemented the U.S played a key role facilitating the Israeli-Palestinian talks. 
President Clinton back then mediated the 1998 Wye River Memorandum, and the 
United States assumed the coordination of its implementation. These negotiations 
 70 
 
were personally handled by President Clinton in 2000 at Camp David. Clinton 
supported peace efforts during his first term, although his direct involvement did 
not become a major factor until his second term. During the Clinton presidency, the 
United States won enhanced status in the region as well as on the international 
arena, sharing a common commitment, building a diverse and solid domestic 
coalition to endorse U.S. leadership in the mediation efforts, contrary to the George 
W Bush administration. However, some weaknesses found in the Clinton’s 
administration approach were less discipline and fewer strategies, lacked of focus 
and follow up. 
The Clinton Administration left in place a bilateral negotiation structure, 
which had run its course the previous year, and invested little in multilateral 
negotiation on an arena that had brought substantial Arab state support and 
involvement to the peace process for the first time.  The administration was aware 
about this but basically ignored it and thus neglected the importance of shaping the 
secret contacts between Israel and the PLO resulting in the Oslo Accords. 
The Oslo Process  
The Oslo Process was a series of bilateral agreements signed in Washington 
following negotiations brokered by the Norwegians. Parts of them were clandestine 
meetings between Israel and the PLO. Its main goal was Israel’s withdrawal from 
the territories of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza strip, in order to allow the 
establishment of a Palestinian Authority for an interim period until permanent 
arrangements could be established. 
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Under this agreement the following goals were temporarily reached: Israel 
recognized the PLO as the legitimate Palestinian representative, and the PLO 
renounced the use of violence as well as recognized Israel right to exist and finally, 
on 2000, both agreed to recognize an autonomous in Gaza and West Bank. But, 
there is a question which might be important to answer, if answers wants to be 
given that might lead to the improvement of the international mediator’s 
performance in this conflict. Why has the Oslo Process not succeeded? Imbalance 
of power, lack of consensus about final goals, lack of focusing on short term 
agreements and, lack of commitment are the most important reasons, as the PLO 
accepted the agreement only as a desperate measure for preserving survival.  
On the Israeli side a debilitating economic situation was the reason to accept 
the terms of the Oslo Process. By securing a peaceful settlement with the PLO, 
Israel could ensure its economic livelihood, which was doing well until this point. 
The Arab market was closed to Israel due to the hostilities associated with the 
conflict. Additionally, when the negotiations leading up to the accords are 
examined, they were lacking in qualitative substance. 
For Sadat, the outstanding issues were caught up in the formalities 
associated with typical U.S. sponsored negotiations. In this sense, there are two 
fundamental characteristics that Oslo negotiations needed for success. 
a) Under certain circumstances private talks (caucuses) might be more 
effectives than bilateral discussions and,  
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b) Balance of power need to be assured due to the recognition of Israel as 
state. 
For Avi Shlaim (2005), one possible answer is the Oslo Accord was 
condemned to collapse from the beginning since it did not address any of the core 
issues in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. However, findings from 
his research suggest a different answer, suggesting as a main reason the fact that 
Israel, under the leadership of the Likud, reneged on its side of the deal. By 
resorting to an outbreak of violence, the Palestinians contributed to the diminishing 
of trust. Without any trust political progress was impossible, but more determinant 
was the Israeli policy on settlement expansion at the West Bank carried out under 
Labour as well as Likud administrations.  According to this author this policy 
precluded the emergence of a viable Palestinian state without which there can be no 
solution to the conflict.   
Finally, for Gallo and Marzano (2009), there were two mistakes involved in 
the Oslo agreement failure. The first mistake, coincide with Avi Shlaim, in 
reference to improper approach to core issues. The second is the miscalculation by 
Israel, which intended to negotiate with a weaker party. Both impacted the future of 
the conflict and the failure of negotiations.  
The Oslo Process as a Case Study for the Limits of American 
Intervention  
The financial aspect, have been identified as an important element of 
international crisis negotiations. However, Scott Lansesky, in his article “Paying for 
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Peace: The Oslo Process and The Limits of American Foreign Aid” maintains that 
“while aid from the United States represents the tangible expression of U.S. 
political and security guarantees, endorsed peace is not the same as buying 
peace”(2004, p. 213), and should not be confused, he argues. In his opinion 
America’s role is not just limited to provide security and political encouragement, 
which should not be restricted to the development of dollars or F-16’s, but to the 
reliability and tangible profits of building a constructive relationship.  .  
According to Lasensky history suggest that it is not aid what establishes 
leverage power in a crisis, the incentive approach have been experimented by the 
U.S. in diverse situations, proven to be an effective tool, in scenarios such as of the 
peace agreements between Israel, Egypt and Jordan, but without of question 
unsuccessful in preventing collapses during Israeli-Palestinian mediation efforts. 
Lasensky argues “that the more than one billion dollars America has spent on 
Palestinians since 1994 has been wasted” (Ghassan, 2007,p. 24). However, his 
position is clear that the Oslo years are an example of circumstances in which aid 
was an imperative U.S. mediation tool. It improved the relationship between Israel 
and Palestine at the time, opening doors for a possible settlement. This was a 
fruitful effort made by the United States, the only thing to wait on, was the Israeli-
Palestinian’s reaction in order to assess the possibility of a ripe moment to use 
strategies that will impulse serious negotiations since “then the U.S. will be in a 
position to use its political, security, and economic muscle to underwrite a 
stabilization and disengagement package” (Lasensky, 2004, p.210), which will 
 74 
 
include perhaps, the negotiation of Israeli settlements, as well as, the building of 
stronger Palestinian institutions among other issues in the best interest of peace. 
What followed next, serves as case study for foreign affairs academics, to research 
deep into the limits of aid in international mediation in order to research on and 
suggest alternatives as well as best practices in using aid as a successful mediation 
strategy or to disregard it and seek some others more effectives.  
Historical records suggest hegemony by the United States or any other state 
in the Middle East triggers resistance, a reason why hegemons have implemented 
from time to time the strategy of involving external players such as European 
countries, Japan and even Russia in regional issues, in the particular Israel-Palestine 
conflict scenario the Quarter is an example. However, the Quartet option endorsed 
by the U.S, even though it was of limited used, it lacked of formal structure, it 
failed to maintain balance of power, interest and composition, as well as consensus, 
demonstrating one more time that surrendering the mediator role to an international 
institution has not been successful so far.   
Even so, after the Oslo process was signed in a White House sponsored 
ceremony, the United States played a very small role for almost two years, leaving 
the hard bargaining to the parties. Washington declined to settle disputes or monitor 
performance. The administration’s eleventh hour intervention in mid – 1995 did 
help to finalize the short-term agreement,  known as Oslo II, which set out the nuts 
and bolts of Palestinian self-rule and committed Israel to a series of withdrawals 
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from Palestinian territory. However, there was not real engagement from Clinton 
administration until very late in the process. 
The Wye Summit (1998)  
The October 1998 Wye Summit in which Clinton brought Benjamin 
Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat together to rescue the process from collapse, 
represented a different, more activist approach with the United States taking on the 
role of arbitrator and moving the parties to adopt a U.S. bridging proposal. 
However, early inaction by the Clinton administration along with the failure 
to hold Israelis and Palestinians accountable to the agreements they had signed, 
were to have far reaching negative consequences for the peace process and for U.S. 
policy. The Clinton team focused intensely on keeping the Israeli Palestine track 
alive and maintaining momentum in the talks, but at the expense of debilitating 
actions by the parties which included Palestinian violence, Israeli settlement 
expansion, corruption within the Palestinian Authority and backsliding by both 
sides, that finally defeated the process. Camp David II talks collapsed with no 
agreement after two weeks. 
A contributing factor to failure was a limited policy process which 
neutralized the progress of U.S. positions on the core issues. The U.S. was 
unprepared to put policies together on complex issues such as Jerusalem borders. 
The Clinton stipulation that the initiative would expire at the end of his term was 
intended to pressure the parties but predictably had the opposite effect. Bureaucracy 
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and confrontation between Republicans and Democrats within U.S. Congress often 
spilled over into foreign policy, including the Israel-Palestine conflict.  
At certain moments, particularly when questions of settlement, were 
debated, the lack of bi-partisan support was a drain on U.S. peacemaking efforts. 
However, Clinton’s leadership on the issue, especially his constant courting of 
Jewish-American interest groups, gave the administration a strong base of domestic 
support. A president who lays the proper ground work at home enjoys much more 
room to maneuver abroad. 
The Middle-East Peace Summit at Camp David (2000).  
The Camp David Summit was a formative event in the history of Israeli-
Palestinian relations and possibly in the contemporary history of the Middle East as 
a whole. It constituted the first attempt ever to reach a comprehensive solution to 
the protracted conflict. It not only ended in failure, but immediately led to an 
unprecedented outbreak of violence that lasted until 2005.  
For Shimon Shamir (2003), there was a significant gap between the ways the 
two parties conceived the purpose of the Camp David Summit. This Israeli 
perspective asserts that the conceptual gap hurt the unfolding of events far more 
than the mutual mistrust, or any of the mistakes made by either side. While he 
maintains that the blame for the failure should be put on Arafat, there are some 
lessons that should be learned.  In order to get supportive public opinion, attention 
must be paid to each side’s perceptions, not just the objectives desired.  
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However, careful thought must be given to the question of process 
management. The facilitator hosting the summit got off to a good start. The summit 
began with an orderly procedure of presenting positions, defining interests, and then 
giving each side its respective assignments. But there was lack of follow up. The 
process became unclear as well as disorganized and there was no realistic American 
contingency plan ready,patterns that should be avoided in any peace efforts to 
follow.  
 In this conflict the issues are all interrelated. Therefore, it is not possible to 
isolate any single issue from the other, but nothing was considered by the Israelis to 
be binding until everything was agreed. The agreement might emerge in phases, but 
the shape of the permanent status agreement was not to change substantially from 
discussions during negotiations. The lesson? When such time comes, the process 
will be back to where it stood at Camp David. 
 Finally, Quandt (2005) cites Gilead Sher, who asserts that there is one 
relevant consideration that must be kept in mind. Approach to easier issues, prior to 
difficult ones, will definitely create a rigid position with which the mediator will 
have to deal. The overall framework agreement on the permanent status should 
provide a solution to certain issues that could be implemented immediately, along 
with a method to solve future issues, on which the parties could not fully agree at 
that point. 
 In contrast, Munther S. Dajani (2005) provides a Palestinian perspective 
based on the fact that the parties did not put enough intention into settling. 
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However, he agrees with the U.S. position that agreements could have and should 
have been reached on the more technical issues, paving the way for addressing 
successfully the more difficult ones. A second issue is the lack of understanding 
between the mediator, the U.S. and one of the parties in conflict, the Palestinians. 
Finally, the Americans believed in Palestinian ripeness, a miscalculation for this 
author. 
 The failure generated intense debate over the timing of the summit, the 
intention of the parties, the adequacy of preparation, the efficiency of the 
negotiators and the way the summit was concluded. The Taba negotiations on 
September, 2000, following the Camp David failure were a final initiative that 
aimed to discuss territorial, refugee and, security concerns. However, again with the 
U.S. lack of involvement due to elections coming, and the change over its 
leadership, the initiative failed to crystalize. 
The negotiation was characterized by aggressive political strategies of the 
Clinton administration on terrorism and rogue states issues, in part apparently with 
the purpose of gaining domestic electoral support as well as maybe reflecting 
protest for a fundamentalist Iran.. The non-relevant areas of policy for this 
administration, such as Islamism, democracy promotion, and economic 
improvement appear to have been assigned to middle level officials. But the big 
issues such as Israel, belonged to the President himself and his immediate entourage 
which included his domestic political advisor, his special envoys for the mediation 
process as well as his National Security Advisor.  
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Overall, the Clinton administration’s commitment and his personal 
dedication to the Palestinian-Israeli process gave him lasting popularity throughout 
the region, demonstrating the desire for maintain U.S. involvement in the process. 
However lessons from Camp David should not be neglected if peace is to occur. 
According to Dr. Ron Pundak (2001) an Israeli historian and journalist, there were 
other main obstacles that U.S. mediation failed to be address in order to succeed. 
There was weak implementation during Netanyahu’s administration, and the 
complex management of permanent status negotiations under Barak. Finally, the 
damaging impact of anti-Israeli  propaganda by the unexperienced and negligent 
Palestinian political system , besides the employment of a double discourse  were 
two factors which lead  the situation to deteriorate into a new cycle of violence. 
The American press has given former President Clinton almost all the credit 
for his role in the success of Oslo Accord. However, historical evidence suggests 
that credit should be given to President George H. Bush for his crucial role in 
removing the main obstacles to peace process during that period.  
On the other hand, that Bush administration failed to do everything that 
could possibly do for purposes of promoting relations with the Palestinians. It used 
American leverage to serve the interest of peace, under the argument of having to 
avoid imposing peace in the Middle East. Despite the lack of leverage to encourage 
peace, the first Bush administration made relevant progress towards the goal of 
conflict resolution. 
4.3.7 George H. W.  Bush vs. Bill Clinton Administration  
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Contrary to the Clinton Administration, which was especially characterized 
by being influenced by domestic pressure, bureaucratic obstacles, and political 
opposition, the Bush administration allegedly sought the creation of U.S Hegemony 
during the 1990’s. Bush’s Secretary of State Baker is identified by Quandt as 
responsible for defeating bureaucratic and domestic obstacles to reach the 
administrations’ goals, particularly during the Madrid Process and other U.S 
policies in the Middle East. In contrast, Hudson (1996) argues that Clinton and his 
close circle gave the impression especially in an election year of being passionate 
and loyal to American interests, particularly when dealing with the Jewish identity 
predicament similar to Truman and Johnson administrations. Perhaps, the Bush and 
Clinton administrations were accurate in asserting that the Arab Israeli Peace 
Process during their terms were an historic diplomatic accomplishment. Certainly, 
the U.S was instrumental in the inducement of the process through the Madrid 
Conference of 1991, but has been ineffective in maintaining or securing progress 
since then.  
4.3.8 The George W. Bush Administration (2001-2009) 
The George W Bush second administration initially pursued a more discreet 
role for the U.S. as the prime mediator in the long-standing conflict. Like the 
Clinton administration, President Bush also envisioned Middle East peace as part of 
its legacy.  
  Unlike in the Clinton era, he let his Secretary of State take the lead, 
refraining from robust personal involvement. Even with Hamas ascendant and 
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Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas nearly powerless in the West Bank, the Bush 
administration pushed forward, but, Secretary of State Powell did not assigned any 
special Middle East envoy and justified the decision by saying that “the United 
States stands ready to assist, not insist.” (Migdalovitz, 2003, p.2), denoting an 
internal inconsistence of intentions and approaches within Bush administration.  
However, after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United 
States, the administration re-approached the peace process strategy, partly to gain 
endorsement from the Arab community. But, the political fallout from the sharp 
disagreements with the Yitzhak Shamir administration, particularly over settlement 
and the White House’s decision to take a firm stance against their continued 
expansion, had a searing effect that outlasted the Bush administration, it 
reverberated well into the Clinton and Bush years and caused the next presidents 
and their administrations to overcompensate in a way that created a different set of 
problems. “The Bush 41 administration deserves credit for taking a ﬁrm stance on 
settlement expansion, an issue that had long undermined Arab trust in the peace 
process and increased Israel’s own vulnerabilities.  
However, by carrying over this policy disagreement into an all-out 
confrontation with the organized U.S. Jewish community, the administration 
weakened its ability to play an active role later on.” (Ibid 2002, page 17). The Bush 
administration’s approach to the conflict lacked both commitment and a sense of 
strategic purpose, damaging its perception of being engaged in the peace process. In 
November 2001, the primary focus of the Bush administration was the war in 
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Afghanistan. According to the then Britain Ambassador in Washington, Christopher 
Meyer, the U.S Secretary of State at the time Colin Powell was pressuring to make a 
policy statement on the issue, planned since the Saudi intervention. However, 
according to Meyer, President Bush’s aversion towards Arafat was obvious, while 
Powell supported a more consistent U.S engagement in the mediation of the 
conflict, he was relatively isolated. Once the Iraq War was in progress, British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, continued pushing the U.S for greater commitment on 
the peace process. During a meeting in Ireland on April 9, 2003, then President 
Bush gave his British counterpart hope by assuring that he was willing to commit to 
the process as Blair was, however, as then U.S National Security Advisor, 
Condoleezza Rice, later admitted such level of commitment on U.S side was not 
possible to honored since the administration was in need to remained focused on the 
Iraq war, during Bush first term.  
In 2003, major initiatives such as the Road Map Peace plan were not 
aggressively pursued, nor supervised, and again lacked sustained diplomatic 
commitment. Abbas repeatedly asked for more tangible support to strengthen his 
hands for internal Palestinian decision making and create more political stages to 
engage Israel. The administration did not respond in a meaningful way. In fact the 
constant emphasis on Palestinian institution building rather than the political 
process appeared to some as a substitute for active engagement in conflict 
resolution. 
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As a response to the escalation of violence at the beginning of 2003, on 
April 30
th
 diplomatic efforts resumed, the Quartet, which included U.S. 
participation offered a proposal to the parties, a Performance-Based Roadmap to 
reach a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, known as the Road Map. 
This was a three phase plan, based on the grounds set by the Madrid Conference, 
and Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), and 1397 (2002), 
agreements previously reached by the parties. This proposal was by Palestinians 
and Israelis, albeit the last one with some mistrust accepted as the foundation and 
reference point to conflict resolution efforts. Beginning on 2002 the Quartet met at a 
series of meetings at a principal and envoys’ levels under the facilitation of Gaza-
based United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process. 
On June 2, 2003 The U.S. President George Bush, King Abdullah of Jordan 
the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the newly Palestinian Prime Minister 
Mahmoud Abbas met in Aqaba, Jordan and Abbas expressed his concern for the 
armed intifada, insisting the need for a cease fire and mediation of the conflict to 
reach an agreement that will lead to the withdrawal of Israel from occupied territory 
and avoid further suffering of the Palestinian people. Also, Primer Minister Sharon 
expressed his assurance to the Palestinian people their understanding of the 
importance of territory contiguity in the West Bank for a two-state solution to be 
possible, guarantying the dismantlement of unauthorized and illicit settlements. The 
meeting was welcomed and supported by the Quartet, as far as it tied parties tied to 
their commitments.   
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The leaders met one more time in Jerusalem on July 1st to follow up 
progress made in Road Map’s application and in a news conference held prior to the 
meeting the Prime Minister Abbas welcomed Israel’s withdrawal from the northern 
Gaza Strip, referring to it as an important advance.  
However, while President Abbas expected to reach an agreement to create a 
committee that would impulse the Road Map’s implementation Primer Minister 
Sharon’s main concern was Israel’s security, in a scenario of extra judicial killings, 
bombings suicide attacks, and separation barriers building that jeopardized the 
negotiations and the prospect for peace and condemned by the General Assembly.   
In November 2003, some progress was made, the Security Council adopted 
resolution 1515, which demanded the cessation of provocation and all form of 
violence, reaffirming the commitment to the two state solution vision, and 
emphasizing the need for a comprehensive peace plan and finally endorsing the 
Quartet’s efforts while reminding the parties the need to fulfil their commitments 
(UNSC 1515, 2003), while Prime Minister announced the unilateral disengagement 
from Gaza strip.  In November, 2003, the Security Council passed UNSC 
Resolution 1515, ratifying the Road Map strategy. Prime Minister Sharon, in the 
meantime, announced a plan for the unilateral disengagement of Israeli armies and 
settlers from the Gaza Strip. Later, an unofficial negotiation was made in December, 
2003, between Israeli and Palestinian representatives of the civil society, headed by 
Yossi Beilin and Yasser Rabbi, former secretaries of Israel and PA impulse a new 
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detailed plan to end the conflict addressing final issues, the Geneva Initiative, which 
count with Israeli and Palestinian public support. 
Following a gathering of the sponsors of the initiative in New York on 
December 5
th
, Secretary-General Kofi Annan maintained that the Road Map was the 
key instrument to make progress, and that the impetus required for peace in the 
Middle East must emanated from those putting their efforts together for change.  
During 2002-2003, the Israel pattern was to divide Palestine in order to 
mediate with the weaker party. This contributed to the further escalation of the 
conflict in 2004, creating again a power imbalance that interfered with the efforts.  
In the meantime, outbreaks of violence intensified with the killing of some soldiers 
the two top leaders of Hamas, Shaikl Yassin and Abdul Aziz Rantisi, the attack of 
Israeli Military vehicles in Gaza strip. According to the United Nations report of 
2008, Israel launched a large operation along Gaza’s border in an effort to reduce 
the incidence of cross border infiltration as well as alleged arm smuggling, in this 
operation according to the report Palestinians houses were demolished, and 
Palestinian civilians were killed, which raise serious concerns. In a period of just a 
month, a series of suicide bomb attacks which involved children, victims of these, 
happened in retaliation for Israel’s actions triggering Israeli occupation which also 
caused the loss of many lives including of Palestinian children. 
On November 11, 2004, at the age of 75, after months of health 
deterioration, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat was buried after an official state 
funeral amidst important demonstrations of mourning and grief among Palestinians. 
 86 
 
Diplomatic contacts marked the start of a new era in 2005. In February Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon, now the head of an Israeli unity government, met at Sharm 
el-Sheikh, Egypt, with Mahmoud Abbas, popularly elected to replaced Yasser 
Arafat as President of the Palestinian Authority. Yasser Arafat's decease generated a 
new Palestinian leadership under Mahmoud Abbas whom oppose violence and gave 
all instructions to make peace efforts on reasonable terms. A Palestinian sponsor for 
peace seemed to be in place and once again, the two leaders agreed. The Palestinian 
leader announced the end of violence and Israeli Prime Minister expressed the 
intention to release nine hundred prisoners as well as the withdrawal of its troops 
from Palestinian territory. However, the vicious cycle would not end, and within 
days the planned agreement would failed when a suicide bombing killed five 
civilians at a Tel Aviv nightclub.  
In March during an international conference promoting the endorsement of 
Palestinian institution building, the Quartet took the opportunity to issue an 
statement to welcome a new intent of Israel to withdraw from Gaza strip. However, 
reiterated that in order to succeed these efforts should be made through genuine 
commitment. While consistent with the Road Map’s parameters, highlighting that a 
partial withdraw will not work. But, Israel only withdrew from Jericho and Tulkarn, 
West Bank towns, after UN Secretary General furthers talks. . 
By April, the Quartet, appointed James Wolfensohn, former president of the 
World Bank, as its special envoy for Gaza disengagement’s efforts, part of his 
responsibilities were to facilitate the handover of economic assets, which included 
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agricultural greenhouses in the evacuated Gaza settlements, by May, Israel released 
four hundred Palestinian prisoners and finally in June, after Israel and Palestinian 
Authority leaders Sharon and Abbass met in Jerusalem, the Quartet intervened 
again and insisted both parties to prevent any escalation of the conflict. These series 
of events that clearly show an indirect participation of the U.S as a member of the 
Quarter, and its inconsistent role as mediator of the conflict. 
Also, the George W. Bush administration was characterized by its strong 
support for Israel. The Bush administration wanted Palestinian leadership to 
renounce terrorism as a resistance mechanism before initiating new peace efforts, 
upsetting Arab leaders in the region. “Arab sympathizers viewed U.S. policy as 
exhibiting a double standard, antagonizing the Arab world, while ignoring Israel’s 
refusal to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 242” (Crotty, 2003, p 5). 
Furthermore according to Daniel Pipes, a foreign policy expert, on the 
Middle East the roadmap was vague about conditions to be imposed on the 
Palestinians and sanctions for non-compliance (Crotty, 2003, p. 10), leading to 
conflict escalation. To make the conflict more intractable, during this two decades 
illegal settlements behind the green line increased nearly twice between 1993 and 
2000 (Gallo, 2009), making the notion of a Palestinian state with a national stability 
and clearly delimitated borders practically unachievable. 
 Israel efforts undermined the PA, and did not respect the content of the Oslo 
agreement. This ended up dividing Palestinian political civil society to the 
detriment of both sides. For Gallo and Marzano (2009), fifteen years prior to 2009, 
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the power balance decreased starting with the Oslo phase and ending with the 
Fatah-Hamas conflict in 2006, leading to a more powerful Israel. 
According to the structure of asymmetry theory discussed by these Gallo 
and Marzano, low power balance and scare conflict awareness meant a very 
unrealistic opportunity for reaching a lasting peace. Their proposition is that unless 
the power balance increases and there exist mutual recognition at its own level in 
terms of status, rights and needs, there is a slight opportunity for reaching a 
substantial peace settlement. In this sense, when addressing distribution of power 
between the parties and spoiler management, Stedman (1997) argues that in order 
for balanced agreements to be possible, power balance must be present between the 
parties, during mediation efforts. In addition, these balanced agreements are vital 
for reducing the possibility that spoilers will appear, and finally, if spoilers are 
already exist, he suggest, then they must be managed by the mediator—something 
the United States decided not to do, withdrawing from its commitment to mediate 
anytime negotiations involved Hamas.  
Regardless, diplomatic efforts to create a national unity between Fatah-
Hamas, the groups were far from reaching a true understanding, making the 
separation between Gaza and the West Bank deeper, and affecting the balance of 
power and fueling the conflict as described above.  
According to Gallo a miscalculation on the side of Israel by provoking a 
division of Palestine as strategy for negotiation, and U.S. failure to follow ripeness 
and commitment during Fatah-Hamas conflict as documented below was the main 
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weakness of Bush administration a great opportunity for spoilers such as Hamas. 
Among this events are: 
4.3.9 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip and emergence of Hamas 
(2005-2006) 
In August, regardless  pressure from Israeli bureaucracy, Prime Minister 
Sharon ordered the removal of all civilian settlements in the Gaza Strip and some in 
West Bank , a month later Gaza Strip, plus Israeli settlement were free from Israeli 
military presence, a move that would mark the first Israeli withdrawal from the 
occupied Palestinian territory since June 4, 1967, Prime Minister Sharon in an 
address to the General Assembly, expressed the acknowledgement of the Palestinian 
people’s right to  a free and sovereign state, while retaining control over, air space, 
territorial waters and Gaza’s border due to alleged security concerns, and 
maintaining his position in reference to an undivided Jerusalem.  
In January 2006, two events would seriously impact the dynamics of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict: Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon would be left 
incapacitated when he suffered a stroke. In addition, while the Bush administration 
pushed hard for Palestinian legislative elections in 2006, they ended up surprised by 
the Hamas victory in elections for a new Palestinian Legislative Council. Hamas 
had by this point already been designated by the U.S as a terrorist group, and 
continued to resort to violence, and it did not recognize Israel, nor accept previous 
agreements. Via the party’s election victory, it was now legitimated when it won a 
majority of seats.  Moreover, President Abbas invited the Hamas leader, Ismail 
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Haniyeh to join in a new Palestinian Government, while almost at the same time, 
Ehud Olmert was elected as Prime Minister of Israel. 
In response to the Hamas election victory, the U.S. along with the EU and 
Israel applied economic sanctions such as withholding of financial assistance from 
the Palestinian Authority to be resumed only if the Hamas led government 
committed to the preconditions to negotiate the recognition of Israel, recognize 
previous agreements including the Road Map, and finally refrained from using 
violence as a resistance method. To relieve the Palestinians from the humanitarian 
crisis and suffering the Quartet approved the transfer of funds for this purpose, 
directly to the Palestinian Authority government. As efforts continued to reduce the 
humanitarian crisis in the Palestinian territory, and Palestinian leaders came 
together to the negotiation table to reconcile the Fatah and Hamas factions, the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict turned bloody.  The Security Council gathered at the 
behset of the United States, met in July but the vote of a permanent member 
blocked the possibility to adopt a resolution to release an Israeli’s war prisoner and 
prevent the use of Israel’s disproportionate use of force.    
In the second half of 2006, Gaza residents were living in a war-like 
environment, with almost daily firing of Palestinian rockets into Israel, and Israeli 
military strikes occurring from land, air and sea, during three months 
approximately, that cost the lives of two hundred and 61 Gazans, including children, 
while two Israelis and fifteen were injured by homemade rockets fired from Gaza 
strip (UN Report, 2008).  
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By September 2006, the formation of a Palestinian Unity Government was 
frustrated by intra-state armed conflict among Palestinian factions in Gaza and 
Israeli forces. Israel bombed Beit Hanoun for six days, which cost the lives of a 
number of civilians. A whole family was killed in an incident attributed to a 
technical error by the Primer Minister, who publically apologized. The Security 
Council failed to agree on a condemning resolution, though the Human Rights 
Council convened to set a fact finding mission, as did the Security Council. A truce, 
non-related to this international bodies’ response, was reached, though by the time 
this happened many civilian lives had been lost. New reconciliation efforts marked 
the beginning of 2007. The White House sought to undermine the Hamas 
government and opposed all attempts to form a Palestinian unified government. 
4.3.10 George W. Bush Administration Reaction to the Palestinian 
Unity Government as a result of Saudi Intervention  
According to Paul Morro (2007) in a report to the U.S. Congress, the newly 
established Palestinian Unity Government only complicated U.S. policy toward the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Peace Process. 
In response to Hamas victory in 2006, the Bush Administration in 
conjunction with Israel and the Quartet, removed financial assistance as well as 
contact with the PA. The administration wanted to neutralize Hamas using isolation 
as well as other methods, while endorsing moderates in Fatah led by President 
Mahmoud Abbas. Instead of weakening Hamas’ power, international sanctions 
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provided an opportunity for Iran to strengthen its influence among Palestinians. 
Hamas’ legitimation through elections made it even harder to isolate them. 
For Daniel C Kurtzer, and Scott Lasensky (2008), the lack of active U.S.  
engagement during the Fatah-Hamas conflict and its failure to engage and moderate 
the actions of all parties, including extreme Islamists, led to failure to reach a 
durable  solution. 
Under the sponsorship of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, Hamas and Fatah 
Saudi met in Mecca in February 2007 as an alternative to U.S mediation. They 
reached an agreement to form a power sharing government within the Palestinian 
Authority, and in March a Palestinian national unity government was formed, 
including members from Hamas and Fatah as well as independent members. Its 
program reflected the intention to honor the agreements signed by the PLO and also 
the decision to seek international legitimacy. But still did not meet the major 
Western donors’ standards of recognition for Israel, besides the commitment to non-
violence. Thus, this alternative was opposed by the U.S. and donor restrictions on 
funding for the Palestinian Authority remained largely in place, amid opposition 
from some Western governments whom decided they will continue to assist Hamas 
members of the Palestinian government.  
In March, a summit meeting of the Arab League in Riyadh agreed to support 
the Saudi Plan adopted in 2002, an agreement that included the recognition of Israel 
in exchange for the Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territories and normalization 
of Israeli-Palestinian relations.  
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In April new meetings between the Palestinian and Israeli Prime Ministers 
occurred in Jerusalem, in order to discuss security and humanitarian concerns, and 
in an effort to build confidence. The Quartet welcomed the initiative and initially 
support the Arab Peace initiative, but again the inter-factional aggression again 
intensified, threatening the prospect of peace. During this period of time, there was 
still U.S. intervention, including the Road Map initiative. However, the United 
States failed to pressure the parties to settle, as division among Palestinians and 
Israelis deepened. .  
4.3.11 Hamas Takeover of the Gaza Strip and its Aftermath (2007 -
Present)  
To worsen the situation, despite diplomatic efforts to establish a unified Fatah-
Hamas government, Hamas violently took control of the Gaza Government in June 
of 2006. President Abbas declared a state of emergency, while creating an 
emergency cabinet and dissolving the Palestinian National Unity Government, a 
decision that the U.S., along with the European Union, supported by renewing 
direct assistance to the Palestinian Authority.  
 With the purpose of encouraging the peace process’ development to a 
durable solution the Quarter appointed former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as 
its representative, expressing endorsement for a U.S.-proposed international 
meeting to facilitate the negotiation of a two-state solution; the strategy failed. 
 Some important factors were neglected in the pursuit of a successful 
outcome. First, re-centralization of presidential powers, and a notable absence of 
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liability as well as transparency in the Palestinian Authority´s financial management 
caused unease among foreign donors and potential and actual mediators. Second, 
the U.S. failed to hold Israel responsible for its legal obligations. Finally, the 
absence of commitment and pressure by the U.S. for an effective Palestinian 
government facilitated the increase of criminal gangs and extremist Islamic groups, 
who actively neutralized attempts by Hamas to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the 
international community, including the U.S.  
According to Muhammad Muslih (1999), U.S. policy towards the 
Palestinians has sought to promote a political answer to all outstanding issues, 
especially the final status issues of Jerusalem, borders, refugees, water and 
settlements. For him the big key is to generate movement toward an agreement on a 
context for settling these issues. 
       Assuming that there exist moderate elements inside Hamas, it would be 
advantageous if U.S. policymakers promoted the participation of these elements in 
PA institutions. Particularly, “they should counsel the PA and Israel to find ways to 
involve moderate Hamas elements in negotiations of final status issues. Indeed, 
their involvement will likely provide a wider base of support for any agreement on 
the issues” (Muslih, 1999, p.44) consistent with the U.S interest of creating a 
permanent solution for all outstanding issues of the Palestinian question.   
Hamas policy during 1996- 1999 was characterized by survivalist behavior 
more than by ideological motivation. Perhaps, when the PA condemned Hamas 
military actions against Israel, Hamas took a soft approach of reconciliation rather 
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than confrontation, as a preventive measure against any possible retaliation against 
their movement, moving towards a push to update their policies.    
Furthermore, Muslih, (1999) suggested two available strategies were 
available to reach the goal of putting in placed U.S policies towards the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. The first is the participation of Hamas moderates in U.S. 
sponsored people-to-people programs, bringing Palestinian and Israelis together for 
constructive dialogue and mutual cooperation activities, as well as public speeches 
by senior U.S. officials showing American interest in working with both individuals 
and groups, including Hamas members, committed to renouncing violence, and 
supporting the peace process, would be effective.  
It would be beneficial if the U.S. administration could more clearly identify 
and classify Hamas members who support violence and discourage as well as 
obstruct any reconciliation with Israel, and those in the group open to promoting 
and engaging in constructive Palestinian-Israeli discussion. However, the possibility 
for the escalation of conflict while using such strategies should be taken into 
consideration and private diplomatic strategies should be planned as effective 
encouragement tools. 
Second, U.S. diplomats should suggest to Israel and the PA that they 
consider the benefits of engaging Hamas moderates, emphasizing the positive link 
between the gradual participation, encouragement, and endorsement of Hamas 
moderates and long-term stability in the conflict resolution scenario. In brief, 
instead of advertising Hamas as a terrorist movement or Islamic radicals, 
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Washington should dedicate more energy to formulating innovative policies that 
would encourage their participation in the peace process as well as to engage in 
mediation for the promotion of the legitimate national goals of the Palestinian 
people. 
Thirteen years later, Chuck Hagel, Secretary of the Department of Defense 
of the United States under the first Obama Administration sustained that the current 
American Policy towards Hamas had failed, and needed to be changed in the best 
interest of Israel. He argues that “if talking to Hamas is bad, not talking to Hamas is 
worse” (Wazman, 2012, p.1). He argues that to ignore or try to change the fact that, 
like it or not, Hamas has actively and legitimately participated in government since 
the 2006 elections, is ineffective and counterproductive. 
 The attitudes and actions of the U.S. have had a relevant impact on the 
participation of Hamas in peace negotiations. Hamas is labeled as a spoiler in 
negotiations as it is—to date—focused on rejecting any settlement with Israel. 
However, U.S. policies as well as some other Western policies have been 
unsuccessful in their goal to overthrow Hamas, something that is contrary to their 
own goals, has infringed on the popular legitimacy of voters, and has had deeply 
negative consequences for the mediation process. 
4.3.12 Consequences of U. S. Withdrawal  
According to Sherif Hafez, Political Science Professor of the University of 
Cairo, interviewed by “Open to Question”, a Nile TV program (January 19, 2010), 
having Saudi Arabia as mediator will probably guarantee the safety of the process.  
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According to him, the Saudis are better able to reconcile Hamas with Fatah as the 
Middle Eastern states have always been involved in the conflict (Egypt, Syria, Iran). 
While the Obama Administration has pushed for peace, Hafez maintained that 
Netanyahu has signed for peace before, and that if he still wants peace, he would 
probably sign again.  If the Saudis reach the goal of persuading many radicals to 
change their views as they have done before, there is no reason for failure. 
However, this seems a rather minority his view, as it is not well supported by the 
Mecca Agreement negotiations, which failed. 
Deutsch (1973, p. 5) and Bercovitch (1989, p, 290) support the claim that 
the parties’ previous and present relationship can impact the development of a 
dispute. In contrast, Yakamoto (1990) argues that friendship can generate excessive 
confidence. Perhaps, the Saudi-brokered deal largely spoiled U.S. efforts to get the 
Palestinians and Israelis back to the negotiating table. 
In an effort to recover the peace process, the U.S. convened a meeting in 
Annapolis, Maryland, on November 27, 2007, of key regional members (Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria),  as well as other members of the international 
community, that produced a joint understanding between the two leaders to launch 
good faith bilateral negotiations to reach a peace agreement which resolved core 
and outstanding issues, without exceptions as previously agreed, before the end of 
2008.The Joint Understanding that resulted is an agreement to form an American-
Israeli-Palestinian strategy, under the leadership of the United States, to apply the 
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Road Map.  Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas also agreed to bi-weekly 
meetings to supervise the process.  
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon welcomed the Joint Understanding, but 
asserted that the U.N. has been involved for the last sixty years, (Partition Plan, and 
Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 1397, 1515), and that now a days, it had 
higher priorities. Still, he demanded more support from the U.N for   this renewed 
effort. 
 Even though the conference resulted in an understanding, an element which 
often contributes to failure—that of a weak mediator—was observed. The U.S. 
made too clear that it has other priorities, as stated by its own representative, and 
thus demonstrated a lack of commitment. Therefore, this event clearly sustains the 
hypothesis that not having a real commitment and support of other parties to take 
the lead, is not a good practice when it comes to international mediation. This is 
also consistent with Bercovitch’s, Touval’s, Zartaman’s and Kleiboer’s assertions in 
reference to the negative impact of a lack of commitment of an international 
mediator in a conflict that “international organizations have commitment problems 
when attempting to try to manipulate disputing parties because of their inability to 
guarantee security or certain payouts over the long term, largely because such 
organizations lack the clout that state actors have” (Bercovitch 1997, Touval and  
Zartmann 1985, Kleiboer 2002, p. 34). This strengthens the assertion that states 
remain the best potential mediator due to their ability to leverage other states and 
interests .  
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The Annapolis Conference draws the international attention and support for the 
efforts of the Israeli and Palestinian leaders to achieve a justified and 
comprehensive peace settlement. The Roadmap as presented by the UN Security 
Council points out the obligations which both of the parties are required to 
implement as early as possible and definitely in parallel. The Palestinians makes an 
immediate implementation of their obligations on security as mentioned in the 
Roadmap, and it reflects their commitment to the peace settlement. For Israel, the 
implementation of its obligations shows its seriousness and intentions toward a 
really credible peace process. Thus, as this thesis tries to argue,  the U.S and not the 
United Nations should maintain its commitment as mediator of this conflict in order 
to achieve peace. 
4.3.13 Obama Administration (2009-Present) 
 According to William B. Quant (2013), recent Arab Israeli events have led 
to a fundamental adjustment of American policies in the Middle East.  Quant argues 
that Obama got off to a good beginning in January 2009 by supporting the plan of 
engaging with the opposition and appointing former Senator George Mitchell to 
supervise the progress of the Administration’s Arab-Israeli policy. As the national 
security advisor he named General James Jones, an officer with substantial 
expertise in reference to the Palestinian question, also demonstrating initial 
commitment to seeking a peaceful solution.  
In public speeches, Obama also made clear ihis determination to generate 
movement towards the Arab-Israeli peace efforts, taking a firm position on an issue 
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particularly sensitive to the Palestinians, the stop of settlement buildings in 
occupied territory. 
 While all of these initiatives raised optimism that U.S policy was shifting to 
a revised and more active stage, there also existed some doubts that circumstances 
which included a global economy crisis and President Obama’s own domestic 
political agenda might force the new administration to lower their expectations   
 In the Middle East, Benjamin Netanyahu was re-elected prime minister. In 
the past, he has firmly resisted U.S. mediation efforts to make progress on the 
negotiations. President Obama did succeed on persuading Netanyahu to show 
support for the two-state solution proposal, but was not successful in stopping 
building settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. 
Altogether, during the first part of 2010, poor progress was made. On the 
other hand envoy Mitchell’s style was so low key, that any gains obtained were 
barely perceived. President Obama and Netanyahu however met the same year for a 
cautious reconciliation meeting as a strategy on the domestic arena. 
 The upcoming Congressional elections pressured President Obama to act 
cautiously not to give the impression that he was excessively tough in its approach 
to Israel. What happened there it is unclear. Apparently, Netanyahu was able to 
persuade the U.S. to support Israel in confronting Iran in exchange for entering in to 
direct negotiation with the Palestinians without any preconditions. As the 
suspension of the West Bank settlement building truce deadline approached, the 
U.S. pressured for the re-initiation of Israeli-Palestinian’s negotiations. Several 
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meetings did take place, however, commitment in both sides was not real, and as 
soon as the moratorium expired the Palestinians suspended their participation in the 
negotiations. By late 2010, the negotiations had reached an impasse; clearly 
ripeness was not present at the time. 
 According to the same author, there have been some weaknesses of the 
Obama Administration approach that could have been avoided. First, President 
Obama’s administration miscalculated Netanyahu’s resistance intentions. When 
Obama was seen to withdraw on the first issue, this damaged his strong leader 
status.  
Second, all prior U.S. successes in Israeli-Arab diplomacy had involved a 
strong president and an empowered Secretary of State who worked together well. 
This strategy worked for Nixon-Kissinger, Carter-Vance and Bush I-Baker. 
However, the Obama administration selected a low key expert to work with, an 
official of tremendous ability, but lacking involvement and identification with 
President Obama. 
 Also, as U.S.-Israeli relations deteriorated, the U.S. went back to an 
undefined role for some aspects of Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy. Moreover, it was 
not clear which of the many of the president’s' advisors were key to his plans of 
reengaging Israelis and Arabs into the peace process. 
A third miscalculation by the administration was to identify the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict in terms of a conflict that could best be settled by the 
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implementation of direct negotiations, neglecting the ripeness element of the 
conflict.  
 Finally, the president’s soft mediation approaches and lack of leverage had a 
negative impact on U.S. national interest, weakening moderate forces in the region 
and empowering radicals, making it harder to deal with emerging spoilers such as 
jihadi extremism, i.e., Hamas.  
Leverage is a vague element of mediation. It is not clearly defined and there 
are inconsistent findings concerning its relevance for positive mediation outcomes. 
Absent systematic research on the impact of these various types of resources, there 
exists disagreement in the literature as to the influence of leverage in securing 
positive mediation’s results. According to Cot (1972, p. 12), Brookmire and 
Sistrunk (1980, p. 326), Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille (1991, p. 15), and 
Touval (1992, p. 233), “leverage is a necessary condition for mediation success” 
(Kleiboer, 1996. p.371). These authors have proven in their empirical investigation 
that leverage is essential to induce disputing parties to make concessions or for 
securing agreement’s compliance.  Pruitt (1981) highlights Kissinger’s success in 
the Middle East, as an illustration of leverage’s relevance in international mediation. 
In his book, Shattered Hopes: The Failure of Obama´s Middle East Process, Josh 
Ruebner, the National Director of the U.S. campaign to end the Israeli occupation, 
lays out his argument.  He maintain that the Obama administration’s approach, by 
failing to involve Palestinians in the process, blocking of international efforts to 
hold Israel accountable for its violations, failure to recognize the asymmetry of 
 103 
 
power between the parties in conflict, as well as failure to create incentives for 
Israel to sincerely commit to a peace process, remains an obstacle for his 
administration to succeed as broker of the conflict. 
For Warren R. Phillips (1978), the perspective of ‘prior behavior’ as an 
explanation of foreign policy contends that the foreign policy behavior of a nation 
can be effectively explained by considering both the types and amounts of foreign 
policy behavior that the nation receives from other nations as well as the nation’s 
own prior foreign policy behavior. Nations develop routines or standardized 
procedures for dealing with each other. 
McClelland (1961, 1966), one of earliest international interaction advocates, 
sustains that interaction analysis has a primary concern tracing patterns of demand 
and response between nations. He suggests that nations have access to only a 
limited inventory of responses in coping with the situations produced by system 
disturbances. How the government of a nation tends to select types of actions from 
the inventory to meet different kind of no routine international situation provides 
evidence of the government operational code of international politics. 
Moreover, he argues that many of current problems experienced to find 
answers to policy weakness, stem from the lack of formal explanation, of the patter 
of interaction between nations. 
Kleiboer (1996) offers two different proposals about the link between 
mediator status and successful mediation results. The first one explores the extent of 
status. She suggest that the opportunities to succeed in international mediation 
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efforts increases, when the mediator possess a high status. In a second proposition 
concerning mediator status analyze the level of rank. She suggests that the status of 
the mediator as well as the status of the representatives of the nations in conflict 
must be balanced. She maintains that the status of the mediator should never be 
lower than the mediating parties in order to be able to remain in control of the 
process, since otherwise, the process might not be taken seriously.  
As of today the conflict remains unsolved. On November 25, 2013, the UN 
General Assembly, in open debate on the Question of Palestine, called on all parties 
in the dispute to “refrain from actions that obstruct negotiations” (UN Department 
of Public Information, 2013). In this sense on same assembly report the 
representative for Pakistan, Massood Khan, expressed that four obstacles impeding 
the success of Israeli-Palestine peace shall be removed in order to move forward: 
Jerusalem, illegal settlements, 1967 borders, and refugees. 
With this said, the Obama Administration should make the mediation 
process as a high priority, and at the same time, recalculate strategies using a more 
hard bargaining approach such as, pressures and inducements to obtain real 
commitment from parties, besides changing its perceptions on its status. 
In reference to Israeli lobbying, if President Obama wanted to succeed and 
honor Cairo Speech, he should follow Theodore Roosevelt or Carter's policies in 
reference to Israel lobby.  Dan Flesher argues that there exist two important venues 
that might be effective in order to deal with Israeli lobby as needed, if peace is 
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wanted to be reached. First, broaden the debate and stop worrying excessively about 
the community. 
There exist comparatively more questions among Americans in reference to 
the understanding of U.S. government passivity in the face of Israeli settlement 
expansion as well as some other troubling policies and actions, translating into a 
political scenario that encourages the new administrations, to protect Israelis and 
Palestinians, while promoting and pressing them to make painful compromises, but 
necessary for peace. 
Moreover, the undermining of the democratic processes, as perceived by 
some Palestinians as a retaliation for their political choice, and the imposition of 
sanctions have acted to discredit the legitimacy of U.S. policies in the peace process 
(Austin, Hoffman, Goddard and Gray, 2011). These policies have failed to achieve 
either defeat or moderation of Hamas.  
Unfortunately, the Obama administration’s lack of leadership in the process 
can be perceived as lack of commitment. The role shifting between President 
Obama, Hillary Clinton, Chuck Hagel and finally the recently appointed Secretary 
of State John Kerry in negotiating the peace process, plus the lack of a strategic plan 
for mediation, the difficulty to show leverage over Israel, the lack of political 
support for a prolonged confrontation or move towards punitive measures against 
Israel, remains an obstacle for peace.  This is especially true, in reference to the 
illegal settlement impasse. 
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For Hoffman, Goddard and Gray, history warn us that this  impasse could  
lead to new violent uprisings , and  more than ever, there is a pivotal to explore new  
reconciliation efforts mechanisms. 
This chapter, based on events, clearly supports the thesis of Michael E. 
Brown and Chantal De Jong Outdraat, Kleiboer and Londoño Lazaro that a clear 
strategy, ripeness, leverage and status are key elements for successful international 
mediation. 
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Chapter Five 
Obstacles and Opportunities for U.S. Mediators’ 
Role in the Conflict 
 
Certain obstacles remain that impede the success of U.S. mediation in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The interactions and behavior of the United States are the 
central sources of such obstacles, identifying them would facilitate the work of 
researchers, mediators, personnel, and other actors involved to improve their 
approaches in order to succeed in the resolution and prevention of further escalation 
of the conflict.  
Some of the relevant obstacles to be discussed in this chapter are the 
different approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict mediation applied by the 
different U.S. administrations since its involvement as mediator of the conflict, 
especially the ones that might frustrate the process, such as lack of commitment to 
their mediator’s role. Also, some relevant incompatibilities on mediation techniques 
based on cultural diversity, and finally, the opportunities available in order to 
improve such weakness will be discussed.  
5.1 Obstacles 
Charles F. Hermann and Maurice A. East. (1978) identify seven different 
perspectives that may help to develop explanations for why nations act. They are: 
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the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders; Decision Structures and Processes; 
Political Features of Regimes; National Attributes of Societies; Properties of the 
International System; Prior Foreign Behavior and Transitory Qualities of the 
Situation. 
Some of these perspectives are indeed an obstacle for the success of U.S. 
mediation of the conflict. Even though the U.S. Role has been without question, 
active and pivotal in the dynamic of this conflict throughout.  The following 
paragraphs clearly answer this thesis’ main research questions: What is the level of 
commitment of the United States as mediator of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict? At 
what points has the United States of America intervened as mediator?  Also, how 
and when has the U.S. role as mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict helped 
improve or worsen the situation? 
As of today, the Obama administration, different approaches sometimes 
inconsistent and definitively lacking of a real commitment as some of the previous 
administrations, has created a series of successes and failures during the process. 
Among the best practices according to the analysis of historical data, are 
commitment, strong leadership, leverage, and proper management of bureaucracy 
which different U.S administrations have neglected during the mediation process 
are an obstacle for peace.  
A vicious cycle among U.S. administrations of maintaining the same 
weaknesses in its performance as a mediator since the beginning of the Israeli 
Palestinian conflict have prevented a better outcome in U.S. mediation efforts.   
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When the records of the different administration’s involvement in the 
process are analyzed, this research finds the following obstacles for a successful 
performance of the U.S as mediator of the conflict. Beginning with President 
Wilson’s lack of experience, commitment and domestic pressure as well as the 
continuance of the Wilson policy by President Truman to finally withdraw have 
been obstacles to being a more effective mediator. In addition, handling over the 
responsibility for mediation to the then-recently created UN, as a national interest 
strategy to neutralize a possible Arab-Soviet Union alliance, as well as a preventive 
measure to possible restrictions on oil supply, by pro-Western Arab countries have 
also weakened the role of the U.S. as a mediator. Passive U.S. intervention, in a bi-
polar superpower competition, and finally, Truman’s administration’s incoherent 
Middle East policy, due to lack of consensus, represented the disaster of policy 
during his administration. 
On the other hand, a strong leverage position and extreme intransigence as a 
miscalculated neutrality strategy during President Eisenhower’s administration 
neglected the possibility of an Arab-French alliance which resulted in the sharing of 
intelligence and armament that fueled the conflict. 
But it was not until twelve years of intense conflict had past, that the United 
States of America formally intervened as mediator of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
in 1960. The Kennedy administration was pro-Israeli. However, that administration 
avoided a bilateral alliance in order to avoid an antagonist Soviet-Arab alliance. 
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Presidents Johnson’s and Nixon’s approaches were soft, merely persuasive, 
in an effort to avoid war. Domestic priorities and Vietnam War issues neutralized 
any intervention by these administrations. Among the barriers for Johnson to use 
leverage or hard diplomacy when needed, were the needs to maintain the pro-
Western Arab-U.S. alliance, sympathy for the Jewish’s cause, and an extreme pro-
Israeli American public opinion. On the other hand, President Nixon decided to 
withdraw and left the efforts under the leadership of his Secretary of State Rogers, 
who opted for a communication facilitation strategy that failed, since Rogers’ Plan 
demonstrated the short term effectiveness of communication facilitation. 
In contrast, Carter’s administration, by being actively involved, led to U.S.-
Israel friction. But his administration generated an agreement, identified by some 
authors in this research as extremely successful and productive for a long term 
period of twenty years helping to improve the situation. At the same time and for 
the first time, he promoted a dialogue under the mediation of the U.S. Thereafter, 
the Reagan administration was credited with the birth of the U.S.-Israel alliance, 
deviating from David’s agreed principle, which led to a refusal of his proposal for 
peace. The Bush Sr. administration played a crucial role in removing obstacles for 
peace. The Madrid Peace Process, under Secretary of State Baker’s direction, 
promoted for the first time direct negotiations among the parties in conflict, and 
also overrode substantial bureaucratic and domestic opposition. 
Similar to Eisenhower’s policy, years later, President Bush Sr.’s harsh policy 
against Palestine, even though more moderate than Reagan’s pro-Israeli position did 
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yield some benefit. Nevertheless, a general absence of personal involvement, lack 
of a strategy as well as an excessive lack of leverage due to domestic pressure from 
Israeli and Arab lobbies under the excuse of respect for self-determination, and 
failure to build solid domestic alliance to support its plan for its implementation, 
paved the way for U.S. failure one more time. 
Contrary to the previous administrations, and similar to the Carter 
administration approach, even with a limited policy that obstructed the development 
of U.S. policies on the core issues, among other domestic barriers such as 
bureaucratic confrontation which damaged foreign policy, President Clinton’s 
commitment built a strong domestic coalition. 
One more time George W. Bush incurred in the same mistakes of some 
predecessors, with the exception of former President Carter. His lack of personal 
involvement, negligence on power imbalance, lack of commitment or sense of 
strategic purpose damaged perception of engagement. The Road Map was vague on 
the rules of game to be imposed on the Palestinians and sanctions for 
noncompliance, leading to conflict escalation. 
After escalation occurred, failure to follow ripeness and lacking of 
commitment to intervene during the Fatah-Hamas conflict, miscalculation and 
neglect of the cultural factor, when empowering Palestinian for elections without 
anticipating the results, paved a road for spoilers to strengthen. What followed the 
above miscalculations was Hamas’ elections victory in Palestine, and after that, U.S 
poor intervention and use of leverage, an isolation strategy that led to the absence of 
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U.S. engagement during Fatah-Hamas civil war, and failure to involve Hamas 
moderate officials, resulting in a conflict prevention and management disaster.  
Moreover, the Bush administration failed to hold Israel responsible for its legal 
obligations and to pressure for an effective Palestinian government.   Finally, after 
the prior events described, the Annapolis effort failed due to a weak mediator 
proposed by the U.S. administration, who abandoned its role as mediator, opening 
opportunities for new conflict managers. There are also important lessons that need 
to be considered. In order to transform conflict management into conflict resolution, 
when the time becomes ripe to address a final status negotiation, evidence suggests 
a realistic approach based on the conditions on the ground must be developed. The 
levels of friction and the resistance to peace need to be neutralized and decreased 
substantially as possible.  
Also, the fact of alternation of administrations and its policies changes as 
well should be taken into consideration and moderated by using some instruments 
created to promote, to some extent, uniformity and commitment to a stable strategy 
on the Israel-Palestine mediation policies to deal with the conflict. This is key to 
preventing escalation or regression of the peace process, and the negative effects of 
delegating the mediator role on U.S. officials, providing them with a lineament on 
strategies, instead of using the trial and error technique, often as a result of lack of 
experience or expertise in this unique and complex conflict. 
But, the change of administration is not the only barrier, the United States of 
America as any other nation possesses national interests. A strategic vision of 
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conflict resolution should be established as a U.S. policy, and its modification 
should be regularly reviewed and adapted, taking in consideration lessons of the 
past in order to avoid lack of consistency in U.S mediator’s role. Conflict 
management and resolution mechanisms as well as spoiler management strategies 
should be carefully evaluated it, in order to be able to prudently accommodate those 
which interfere with the U.S. national interests, including peace in the Middle East 
for purposes of National security. 
Discussing the Domestic Politic Model, Michael E. Hudson argues that 
Quandt disagrees with those radical positions that U.S. Policy in the Middle East is 
mainly the manifestation of the Israel Lobby or the Oil Lobby, even though this is 
the analysis made by some analysts. 
According to Hudson, it is accurate to just say that both of these lobbies 
have significantly impacted some governments and parties, sometimes mutually 
neutralizing each other. Yet, it is important to highlight the fact of the imbalance of 
power since the Pro-Israeli lobby is a stronger one in comparison with others, even 
within the U.S Congress and the White House, succeeding in pivotal issues such as 
recognition of Israel, diplomatic support as well as economic and military support 
against strong opposition among some within the international community 
condemning the creation of the state of Israel.  
According to Waltz and Mearsheimer (2006, p. 2), extensive reasons exist 
for “U.S. leaders to adopt a Middle East policy that is more consistent with wider 
U.S. interests”. In particular, using U.S commitment and leverage to obtain a fair 
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peace between Palestinians and Israelis would facilitate the wider goal of combating 
extremist. However, these authors are pessimistic that such goals can be achieved 
any time soon. They maintain that the Israeli lobby, by sabotaging U.S. leaders from 
compelling Israel to make real efforts on settling, has also made it difficult to end 
the war, giving extremist a powerful recruiting tool and contributing to global 
Islamic radicalism. They attribute that the lobby is being successful in transforming 
the U.S. into a de facto indirect contributor for Israeli expansion in the occupied 
territories 
Finally, one can argue that the lobby’s influence has been bad for Israel, 
since it has discouraged Israel from seizing opportunities rather using its abilities to 
influence Washington to support an “colonialist agenda” (i.e., discouraging a final 
execution of the Oslo Accords), empowering extremist movement such as Hamas, 
and reducing the possibility of a real disposition for Palestinian leaders to accept a 
full settlement and implement it. Israel would probably strengthen its capacity to 
safeguard its national interest for survival by neutralizing excessive intervention by 
the Israeli lobby, and the U.S. could increase its mediator’s role by enhancing its 
policy and commitment to their intervention in the process. 
For national security purposes the United States should maintain some level 
of leadership or hegemony. However, for Christopher Layne (2009), the U.S. can 
successfully prolong its hegemony on international politics by reverting to multi-
polarity. The truth is, either in a unipolar or multipolar world, the U.S. should work 
on taking the lead in institutional reforms in order to retain its credibility and 
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legitimacy to maintain leverage, an important element needed to succeed in their 
broker role in any international conflict, including the Israeli-Palestinian one. 
Other factors present in the failure of this mediation process lead by the 
United States are: 
5.1.1 Incompatibility on Conflict Perception and Conflict Resolution 
Approaches 
For Stephen John Stedman (1991), in some cases, mediators act to assist 
participants to avoid a humanitarian crisis and loss of innocent lives. Moreover, 
unfortunately sometimes they lack of a coherent plan. By not having a clear 
strategy, a lack of focus prevails, jeopardizing the outcome by the change of their 
foreign policy as a result of the natural alternation in the administration, in the case 
of democratic state mediators as the case of United States leading to sometimes an 
involuntary lack of commitment in their role as mediators.  
Second, mediation efforts must be ripe or timed to coincide with moments 
when at least one and preferably all of the parties to a conflict prefer talking to 
fighting.  Third, mediators need to have leverage over disputants, the more the 
better; this remains a key reason why active involvement on the part of the U.S is 
necessary for success  
             The George W. Bush administration reflected a lack of consistency in their 
commitment as mediators of the conflict. According to this research, sometimes this 
comes as a result of frustration due to incompatibilities between Western and non-
Western approaches to conflict perception, and conflict resolution strategies as well 
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as lacking of proper approaches to deal with different cultures to the Western, as in 
the case of the Palestinians. Even though this is not the main focus of the research, 
this author consider relevant to dedicate a section that could promote the interest of 
further research as an important element to be considered in order to improve 
international mediation techniques by the United States, especially in order to avoid 
withdrawal as mediator as a result of frustration and inability to properly understand 
culturally different spoilers and deal with them. 
5.1.2 Western and Non- Western approaches on Conflict Resolution. A 
neglected perspective 
 While conflict is inherent in relations between humans, the nature of conflict 
and the methods of conflict resolution differ from one socio-cultural context to 
another. 
“Conflict is commonly perceived as a symptom of the need for change. 
While conflict can lead to separation, hostility, civil strife, terrorism and 
war, it can also stimulate dialogue to promote a fairer and more socially just 
solutions leading to stronger relationship and peace” (Irani, 1999, p. 2). 
 Irani argues that a core belief of western conflict resolution academics that it 
is possible to reach a final and full settlement in a conflict and that as a matter of 
fact all conflicts can and should be fully settled. This philosophy is not compatible 
with views of other cultures, particularly non-westerners. For Irani, some conflicts, 
irrespective of their nature, may be intractable, sometimes developing through 
periods of  hostility and escalation as well as periods of calm and a return to the 
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current vicious stage. This scenario can be particularly observed in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. This is the reason why this author takes the idea of conflict 
prevention and management to illustrate the processes of bargaining and 
compromise in the Arab-Islamic practice. 
Irani maintains that, a relevant assumption on U.S. approach to conflict 
resolution is that conflict generally breaks out due to different understandings 
regarding facts, concerns, beliefs, comforts and relations. According to well-known 
anthropologist Laura Nader, conflict is the result of rivalry between two parties or 
more. These conflicts are caused by incompatibility of expectations or intentions, 
and based on its length it may be differentiated from friction or heated clashes 
triggered by temporary escalations.  
  In western interpretations conflict may also have a positive aspect, acting as 
catharsis to re-approach the interaction between parties facilitating the exploration 
of possible settlements. Many of the most vicious conflicts comprise longstanding 
cycles of persecution, abuse and retaliation, with racism and ethnic cleansing as 
some of the most dramatic expressions of this dynamic, having risky political 
repercussions for the situation.   
During the last few years, analysts have been addressing the need to take 
into consideration acknowledgement and forgiveness as necessary elements 
peacemaking efforts. Moreover, “in some countries of the Middle East, the teaching 
and practice of conflict resolution is still a novel phenomenon. Conflict resolution is 
viewed by many as a false western panacea, a program imposed from outside and 
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thus insensitive to indigenous problems need and political processes. Indeed, many 
people in the Middle East view conflict resolution as a fictional scheme created by 
the United States which primary goal is to facilitate and accelerate the processes of 
peace and normalization between Israel and its Arab neighbors”  (Irani, 2000, p.1). 
During years of research, and while assessing the probability of successful 
application of Western mediation models in non-Western societies, scholars and 
specialists have found that is necessary to acknowledge the need to be sensitive to 
indigenous patterns of behaviors (thinking, feelings, rituals) when trying to prevent 
or manage conflict. In order to succeed in mediation in the Middle East, perhaps the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, diplomatic efforts should be complemented by other 
mediation techniques with a wide and real exploration and consideration of fears 
and mistrust resulting from a vicious cycle of years of aggression and retaliation. 
   Middle East mediation has been a slightly artificial phenomenon meaning 
that diplomatic settlements have not trickled down to the grassroots. Peace 
agreements reached exclusively through coercion, political-economic incentives, or 
merely strategic considerations cannot endure if they are not complemented by an 
open and deep assessment of the fears and mistrust resulting from a vicious cycle of 
years of victimization and retaliation.  
For Irani, if peace efforts are to succeed in the Middle East, policymakers 
have the responsibility to foster and encourage an understanding that takes into 
consideration indigenous processes of reconciliation. In this sense, R.B.J Walker 
argues that in order to explain the relative neglect of culture in foreign affairs and to 
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understand why the term causes so little theoretical controversy in this context, the 
same philosophical questions are asked about the concept of culture itself. The 
problematic nature of the conventional answers to these questions remains obscure  
However, while this issue is significant, instead of broad references to 
culture, there is a particular concern with the problem of values or ethics, which 
might involve the absence of moral standards in the behavior of foreign affairs. 
The implication is that while values may be appropriate within a sovereign 
community, they are more difficult to justify in relations of power between states. 
Thus, in foreign affairs, order takes priority over justice, being understood as 
resulting from the needed use of force. Culture is thus is not only excluded from the 
realm of realpolitik, except as propaganda, but is likely to be indicted as a hindrance 
to the special responsibilities of nations struggling to maintain order in a realm 
tragically devoid of ethical standards. 
In this context, there remains a need to analyze the special force of the 
conventional debate between realists and idealists in the theory of international 
relations. The main argument is about the dangers of transposing values appropriate 
for sovereign political communities into a realm characterized by competition 
between sovereign communities. Culture dissolves into cultures, translating into 
values, raising the issue of relativism rebound all this into a clash of power politics.  
This leads straight to a third aspect of the relative neglect of cultural 
processes in the analysis of international interaction. For Walker, if culture can be 
resolved into the categories of political community, and into exclusionist distinction 
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among cultures, then it becomes nothing but an affirmation of the most basic 
conventions of the theory of international relations as these have risen since the 
early modern era. When questions focus on sovereignty and national identity, then 
two interesting issues to explore and overcome are found: Culture as a deeply 
fractured character of human communities, and the way such divisions have in fact 
been resolved by the fragile accommodations of statesmanship. If academics and 
researchers refuse to reduce cultural differences to the mapping of state boundaries, 
then how do the dynamics of eruptions of ethnic violence make sense? 
Michael E. Brown and Chantal de Jonge Outdraat (1996), argue that 
reaching a negotiated settlement is only the first step, since many solutions fall 
apart in the implementation phase of the process. Some of the problems that tend to 
occur at the implementation stage are bad faith on the side of parties when heading 
to the negotiation table, a lack of interest in negotiation, and using the process in 
order to buy time. 
Second, local leaders often overestimate their popularity and their 
opportunities in election, after a settlement is reached. Third, there is usually 
dishonesty at the time of the implementation of the agreement, with the parties to 
the conflict preferring the resumption of warfare, and finally it is difficult to control 
spoilers in any conflict. 
On the other hand, scholars such as Jonathan Austin, Benjamin Hofmann, 
Beatrice Goddard and Hannah Grey (2011), sustain that Western policies, including 
sanctions, only promote empowerment of intense currents within Hamas and 
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intensification of intra-Palestinian confrontations, evidenced by Hamas-Fatah civil 
strife, concluding in June, 2007 with Gaza’s takeover and the dissolution of the 
NUG. A good example of a U.S administration that improperly handled spoilers, 
withdrawing from their responsibility as mediator of the process in order to avoid 
escalation of the conflict, was the George W. Bush administration. Its strategy was 
to direct all reconciliation and reconstruction efforts to the West Bank, basically in 
an effort to build a Palestinian state, ignoring Hamas in Gaza strip (Webster, 2009). 
The Bush policy of isolation failed and Hamas did not soften its position towards 
Israel, and Hamas also did not collapse as predicted under the economic pressure 
exerted by the sanctions. Rather, contrary to what expected sanctions strengthened 
its domestic support (O' Donnell, 2008), a lesson consistent with the trust oriented 
approach mentioned on the literature review. 
5.2 Opportunities 
The solution, in order to improve such weaknesses is to create more open 
debates and a sincere dialogue about U.S. policies in the region and commitment to 
their mediator’s role in the Israeli-Palestinian process. It is also vital to take into 
consideration the role of the lobbies in obstructing such commitment and strategies 
to deal with this conflict.  
Brown and de Jonge Oudraat, suggest that in order to succeed, mediation 
should not be used as a placebo by the U.S. Instead it should be seen as a policy 
instrument, and used judiciously and under circumstances that encourage success, 
in order to increase credibility of future mediation efforts. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
This research suggests that the United State administration should take a 
more active and dominant role as the primary mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, avoiding withdrawal under frustrating circumstances, which includes the 
suggestions mentioned above. For Neumann (2009), President of the American 
Academy of Diplomacy, “engagement need not be viewed as surrender”. Other 
strategies including pressure should be combined to secure U.S. policy goals. For 
Neumann, “the notion that the U.S. must choose between negotiation and the use of 
force is a false dichotomy”. Remaining involved in this most complex situat ion will 
give Washington the options and information it needs in order to succeed as a 
broker that if it disengages, it will not have. 
History suggests, commitment, leadership, and a gradual approach should be 
maintained rather than pushing for a solution that is not ripe. Unilateral reciprocal 
measures should be increased considerably. This is a necessary requirement for the 
success of the international mediator role. 
The alliance dynamic should be reassessed, designing new strategies that are 
more consistent with the leadership role the United States is trying to maintain in 
the best interest of its nation, while interacting under the game rules of an anarchic 
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world. These approaches will facilitate the work of promoting international order in 
conjunction with international institutions, and will reduce antagonistic resistance. 
  At the same time, promoting a better order of alliances that fits U.S. 
national interests in the Middle East, without giving the impression of relying on a 
sole nation for security and other purposes in the region, or of vulnerability in the 
world, and allowing a different balance or re-equilibration of power as Michael 
Sheehan in Klieman suggests (2000) will probably be a better option for the U.S. to 
successfully fulfil its role as a mediator. This will definitely safeguard the strategic 
alliance of the U.S. and Israel under a more safe approach for both nations and 
contribute to US strength as a hegemon, whether in a unipolar or multipolar world. 
While the U.S. can never hope to fully control the conflict or mediation dynamic a 
sole nation is not able to control a hundred percent, but is able to control their 
opportunities for success as a leading nation, and within the present international 
dynamic by avoiding spoilers to use what history suggest is a fallacy in reference to 
U.S.-Israel alliance, a spoilers´ strategy to obstruct U.S. status as international 
mediator and sabotaging peace in the Middle East. 
For national security purposes the United States should maintain some level 
of leadership. However, the country should work on taking the lead in institutional 
reforms in order to keep the authority and legitimacy to retain leverage, an 
important element for success as a mediator of any international conflict, including 
the Israeli-Palestinian one.  
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If peace in the region is to be achieved, the United States needs to take an 
active role, as well as revitalize an aggressive policy which has the internal political 
drive to enforce the suggested long-term policy for achieving peace in the region. 
The U.S. must stimulate secret talks, as needed, between the Israelis and a 
legitimate Palestinian representative to mediate an end to the hostilities and the 
recognition of Israel’s right to exist as well as the State of Palestine sovereignty. 
Israeli’s settlements within Palestinian territory must stop, and border passage 
should be arranged and an active role in this issue by the U.S must be present in 
order to bring peace. 
  As Stedman asserts, spoilers may be active or emerge as a result of 
unbalanced agreements among other reasons. It is crucial that in either scenario, 
mediators manage spoilers, in order secure the success of the mediation process 
instead of refraining from intervening regarding this issue.  
An international standard that takes in consideration different values should 
be promoted along with efforts for its acceptance by the majority of the nations that 
have values that are different from Western values. However, while this goal is 
being achieved, mediation tools should be adapted to meet the needs of nations in 
conflict and an improved policy that secures U.S commitment to intervene in these 
circumstances should be discussed  
Finally, the position of the United Nations as well as some others clearly 
shows that a lack of consensus about world order and normal conduct within it, 
besides confusion about commitments to enforce norms and limits on deviant 
 125 
 
behavior, has given rise to conflict in the new era. It would be beneficial to promote 
within constructivist supporters the increase of research on international mediation 
methods that include mediator commitment as an essential element for successful 
mediation, in order to create a uniform model which improves performance. 
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